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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued a
decision in June 2003 on a number of matters that might not seem
likely to arouse much public excitement. Its order permits certain
combinations of cross ownership for television stations, radio
stations, and newspapers; relaxes the limits on ownership of local
television stations; slightly tightens the rules on local radio
ownership; and increases the national television station ownership
limit.1 But as it turns out, these changes—and in particular the
change in the national television ownership limit, which increased
the cap on the percentage of households in the nation reachable by
a given company’s stations from 35% to 45%—produced a firestorm
of controversy. The FCC received more comments than it has for any
other proceeding (more than 750,000), and the overwhelming
majority urged the FCC not to relax its ownership limits.2 After the
FCC did so, the fight moved to Capitol Hill, where the FCC suffered
a stunning rebuke: broad bipartisan majorities voted to rescind the
FCC’s increase in the national television cap—and in fact to codify
the 35% limit and leave the FCC with no discretion to raise it.3 This
provision was included in the omnibus spending bill for the 2004
fiscal year.4 The Bush administration responded by threatening to
veto the omnibus bill (full of spending initiatives dear to both the
President and members of Congress) if the 35% provision remained
in the bill.5 Eventually, Republican leaders in the House and Senate
1. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 FCC Ownership Order].
2. See, e.g., id. at 13,957 (Copps, Comm’r, dissenting). As Commissioner Copps stated:
This proceeding has generated three-quarters of a million comments now—more
than any other proceeding that I am aware of in the history of the FCC. Of those
comments, all but a few hundred are from individual citizens. And of those,
nearly every one opposes increased media consolidation—over 99.9 percent!
Id.
3. For example, the Senate passed a joint resolution in which it entirely “disapprove[d]”
of the FCC’s new broadcast ownership rules. S.J. Res. 17, 108th Cong. (2003) (enacted).
4. See 149 CONG. REC. H7248 (2003) (amending the appropriations bill that would have
returned the national ownership cap to 35%).
5. See Louis Jacobson & Bara Vaida, Broadcast Blues, NAT’L J., Aug. 9, 2003 (noting that
“President Bush has threatened to veto anything that overturns the FCC’s decisions”).

2004]

NATIONAL TELEVISION OWNERSHIP CAP

441

agreed to change the legislated national ownership level to 39%.6
That, too, provoked outrage: many members of the House and
Senate, from both parties, denounced the move from 35% to 39%.
They noted that broad majorities in both houses wanted a 35% limit,
and they vociferously opposed any increase.7 By late January 2004,
almost four months after fiscal year 2004 had begun, the pressure
to pass the omnibus spending bill was too great, and the 39%
compromise was enacted.8 A significant number of senators,
however, restated their outrage at the increase to 39%.9
This series of events raises a couple of questions. First, what is at
stake in this increase in the national television ownership limit? Is
the level of controversy justified, and, if so, why? Second, is the
increase in the ownership cap a good idea? Upon what basis should
we evaluate that cap, and what is the result of that evaluation?
This Article puts forward answers to these questions. The
analysis reveals that most of the reasons proffered by opponents of
the increase in the national ownership limit do not stand up to
scrutiny—they are largely unrelated to the increase in the limit.10
The main thing at stake in the ownership limit is the level of
influence local affiliates will have in killing television shows. In
other words, the question is whether the decision makers who
choose to cancel a given television show will be the network
executives, as is the case for cable programming, or will also include
local television stations.11 That is not an insignificant question.
Those who mistrust the values and priorities of the network
6. 150 CONG. REC. S142 (2004) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
7. See, e.g., id. (arguing that the 39% cap “means that the door is opened to massive
consolidation of the most important news outlets in local media markets” and that “the
Omnibus appropriations bill defies the will of the Senate and House and provides a belated
holiday gift to big corporations”); 149 CONG. REC. H12,315 (Jan. 22, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Obey) (calling the 39% compromise “a national scandal,” “a back room” deal, and “an arbitrary
judgment”).
8. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-199, tit. VI, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99100 (2004). The rider specifically rids the FCC of its forbearance authority, 47 U.S.C. § 160
(2000), and requires divestiture, within two years, for entities exceeding the 39% cap. Tit. VI,
§ 629, 118 Stat. at 99.
9. See, e.g., Bill McConnell, New Ownership Cap Fits Fox, CBS Perfectly: But Foes of Big
Media Threaten to Resume Legislative Fight Later, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Jan. 26, 2004, at
5 (quoting Senate leaders who vowed to continue the fight against the higher 39% cap).
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See infra Part II.B.
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executives would prefer that local owners have some veto power
over television shows. Those who focus on ensuring the long-term
economic viability of network broadcast television, however, would
prefer that local owners not have this power. Any difficulties that
broadcast networks have in guaranteeing a national audience for
their programs constitute a competitive disadvantage for broadcast
networks vis-à-vis their cable counterparts.12 Those who want local
veto power and viable networks face a trade-off in which satisfaction
of one aim endangers the other.
So how should we evaluate the choice? When local affiliates
preempt network programming to send a message to the networks,
as they often do, instead of simply to carry a popular local event,
such as a local sports event, they often preempt shows they deem
inappropriate for their communities.13 This judgment of inappropriateness has consistently entailed shows that are perceived as
beyond the bounds of good taste, as defined in that community.14
That is, a large number of local vetoes of network programs have
arisen because affiliates deemed the material offensive to their
audience. Unsurprisingly, then, such vetoes have been a tool of, and
have been embraced by, cultural conservatives.15 If you believe that
network executives are too ready to bring sex and violence onto the
television screen, you may have sympathy for greater local veto
power.
For those who are not sympathetic to the concerns of cultural
conservatives, the choice may seem easy: increasing the national
ownership limit will have a desirable result, enhancing the viability
12. See infra Part II.C.
13. See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. In a few cases, affiliates have
preempted shows with terrible ratings, regardless of offensiveness. By and large, however,
those shows were already in a death spiral before those decisions were made; the affiliates’
refusal to carry them just hastened their inevitable demise.
14. See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. Affiliates have no history of preempting
a program because it is too tame for local consumption.
15. For example, the North Carolina Family Policy Council, an organization devoted to
“advocating traditional family values,” argued to the FCC that the owner of two local
Raleigh/Durham, North Carolina affiliates should be applauded for preempting shows that
“demean marriage” such as “Cupid,” “Temptation Island,” and “Married by America.” John
L. Rustin, Director of Government Relations, North Carolina Family Policy Council,
Testimony at the Federal Communications Commission Public Hearing on Localism (Oct. 22,
2003); North Carolina Family Policy Council, Program Won’t Run on Local TV Station (July
9, 2003), available at http://ncfamily.org/stories/030709s1.html.
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of broadcast television networks, and keeping the cap at the same
level will have an undesirable one—empowering cultural conservatives. But the matter is not so simple. In my view, the demise of
broadcast television would be a salutary event.16 It would free up
valuable spectrum, lead to more innovative and more variegated
programming, and limit the incentive for and scope of government
control over communications. In other words, what is bad for the
viability of broadcasting is good for the country.
In Part I of this Article, I briefly lay out the background to the
increase in the ownership limit, and the response to that increase.
In Part II, I consider the various arguments that one might put
forward, and that opponents often did put forward, against the
increase. I identify the contentions, evaluate their relevance to this
rule change, and conclude that the only apt argument is that an
increase in the ownership limit would diminish the likelihood of
local affiliates preempting national programs and thereby sending
a signal to the national network about the desirability of that
program. Such a signal is a cost to networks, as it limits their ability
to guarantee national airing of a given program. Thus the axis
implicated by the increase in the ownership limit is enhancing the
economic viability of broadcast television networks versus enhancing the ability of affiliates to veto programming that they do not
want to carry.
In Part III, I evaluate this trade-off, finding that cultural
conservatives should strongly favor a lower limit (as they do), but
that everyone else—including the liberal groups that opposed the
increase17—should prefer a lower limit as well. Increasing the
ownership cap means not only enhancing the ability of national
networks to air programs but also enhancing the networks’ viability,
and the latter effect is one that America would do well to avoid. The
impact of national broadcast networks, I argue, has been more
baleful than helpful. We should look forward to their demise, or at
least their migration to cable and satellite, so that the spectrum can
be devoted to the highest valued uses.
Part IV considers the implications of these arguments, finding
that the demise of broadcasting, on its own, will have relatively
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
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little effect on the convergence of cable and satellite regulation with
broadcast regulation. In addition, we should be able to avoid the
worst of all worlds—spectrum dedicated to broadcasting (and only
broadcasting), but no one watching via broadcast anymore. The
larger point is that broadcasting is slowly dying. As matters stand,
its death spiral will take many years. We should cheer developments that speed its demise.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE INCREASE IN THE NATIONAL TELEVISION
OWNERSHIP LIMIT
The national television station ownership rule18 prohibits any
entity from controlling television stations, the combined potential
audience reach of which exceeds a given percentage of the television
households in the United States. Note that the limit is not on the
percentage of households that actually watch one of the owner’s
stations, but instead is on the percentage of homes to which those
stations’ signals are available.19 It is entirely possible that an entity
owning stations that reach 35% of American television households
is watched at any given time by less than 1% of Americans. Indeed,
such a striking disparity between audience reach and actual
audience is highly probable.20
A word on the structure of networks may be helpful. Each
broadcast network (for example, CBS) puts together programming
that it wants to send out to viewers. The network then sends that
programming to local television broadcasters with whom it is
affiliated. Those affiliates then broadcast the programming to their
local viewers. Some of those local stations are simply affiliates (i.e.,
they are owned by a different entity), and others are both affiliated
with and owned by the network.21 The national ownership cap
prevents any one company from owning (as opposed to merely
affiliating with) local stations that reach more than a certain
18. This rule is sometimes abbreviated “NTSO,” but this Article will generally eschew that
form, as it is both needless and unfamiliar to those not steeped in the field.
19. See FCC Broadcast Radio Services 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)(2) (2003) (defining national
audience reach as the number of television households in a given market).
20. In order for a set of stations’ market share to equal its audience reach, 100% of homes
in every market would have to watch the relevant station.
21. See 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, ¶ 600.
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percentage of households.22 Accordingly, what is directly at issue in
the national ownership limit is the ownership of affiliates, and the
perceived advantages that flow from having multiple owners of
affiliates.
The companies that are in danger of owning stations that reach
more than 35% of television households are the major broadcast
television networks. In fact, two of them—CBS and Fox—already
exceed the 35% limit.23 They have purchased stations that reach
about 39% of television households, thus leading to the legislative
compromise noted above.24 So a big concern is that not only will a
single company own a significant number of stations, but also that
that company will be a major broadcast network. Opponents suggest
that the networks already have so much power over communications
in this country that the prospect of the networks owning more
stations is particularly troubling.25 These opponents argue that if
the entities owning stations reaching 45% of television households
are major television networks, it raises greater concern than would
be applicable if a garden-variety company owned such stations.26
22. Because the 35% limit applies to the percentage of the national audience reached, the
number of actual stations that one entity can buy will vary depending on the audience reach
of each station. Under the 35% limit, a given entity might be able to buy a majority of the
stations affiliated with any given network—even a national network like CBS—if it bought
the stations in the smallest markets. In reality, the broadcast networks’ strategy has been
quite different: they have focused on the stations with the highest audience reach. As a result,
they own far less than 35% of their affiliates, but their audience reach is 35%. The audience
reach is higher in the case of CBS and Fox, which both fueled CBS’s and Fox’s opposition to
the 35% limit and reflected their belief that the limits would be raised, either by the FCC or
by the courts. See infra notes 23-24.
23. See The Top 25 Stations Groups, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Apr. 19, 2004, at 50
[hereinafter Top 25] (assessing CBS at 38.92% and Fox at 37.92%).
24. See id.
25. See, e.g., 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, at 13,953 (Copps, Comm’r,
dissenting):
This decision further allows the already massive television networks to buy up
even more local TV stations, so that they control up to an unbelievable 80 or 90
percent of the national television audience. Where are the blessings of localism,
diversity and competition here? I see centralization, not localism; I see
uniformity, not diversity; I see monopoly and oligopoly, not competition.
Id.; infra note 72.
26. No non-network station group exceeds the 35% cap, although Tribune reaches 30.02%
of the national audience reach by owning twenty-six stations, nineteen of which are not
affiliated with a network. Top 25, supra note 23. Gannett, the next largest non-network
station group, owns twenty stations covering 17.63% of the national audience. Id. By contrast,
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The national ownership cap began as a limit on the number of
stations an entity could own. In the early 1940s, the FCC promulgated a rule prohibiting common ownership of more than three
television stations (later raised to seven).27 In 1984, the FCC
announced the repeal of any national ownership cap, subject to a
six-year transition period during which the limit on common
ownership would be twelve stations.28 Many members of Congress
opposed this repeal, and Congress passed legislation in 1984
blocking implementation of the FCC’s order.29 The FCC responded
by reconsidering the national ownership limit and issuing a new
order that prohibited common ownership of stations that, combined,
reached more than 25% of the national television audience, and also
prohibited common ownership of more than twelve stations
regardless of their combined audience reach.30 Congress revisited
the issue in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which directed the
FCC to eliminate the twelve station rule and to raise the cap on
audience reach to 35%.31
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 also contained a provision
providing that the FCC “shall review ... all of its ownership rules
biennially ... and shall determine whether any of such rules are
necessary in the public interest as the result of competition.”32 The
FCC conducted its first such biennial review in 1998 and, after some

the big four networks reach 38.92% (CBS), 37.92% (Fox), 33.56% (NBC), and 23.48% (ABC)
(all percentages were calculated using the FCC’s UHF discount). Id.
27. See Broadcast Services Other than Standard Broadcast, 6 Fed. Reg. 2282, 2284-85
(May 6, 1941) (imposing a national ownership limit of three television stations); Amendment
of Section 3636 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations Relating to Multiple Ownership
of Television Broadcast Stations, 43 F.C.C. 2797-2798, ¶ 3 (1954) (increasing the limit to
seven stations).
28. Amendment of Section 73.3555 [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636] of the
Commission’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast
Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, ¶¶ 109-10 (1984).
29. See Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 98-396, § 304, 98 Stat. 1369,
1423 (1984).
30. Amendment of Section 73.3555 [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636] of the
Commission’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast
Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d 74, ¶¶ 38-39 (1984).
31. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
32. Id. § 202(h), 110 Stat. at 111-12. The provision then states that “[t]he Commission
shall repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in the public interest.” Id.
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prodding from Congress to complete its review,33 voted three to two
in 2000 to keep the 35% national television ownership limit.34
Broadcast networks brought suit challenging the FCC’s refusal to
increase the ownership cap in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC.35
The FCC proffered several diversity rationales for the 35% limit,36
but the circuit court was unpersuaded. The court concluded that
“the Commission has adduced not a single valid reason to believe
the NTSO [National Television Station Ownership] Rule is necessary in the public interest, either to safeguard competition or to
enhance diversity.”37 The court remanded the rule to the FCC for
reconsideration.38
By the time Fox was decided, the FCC had already initiated a
reconsideration of two of its ownership rules. After Fox and another
case39 vacated one rule and remanded two others (including the
national ownership limit), the FCC decided that it would comprehensively reexamine all six of its ownership rules. FCC Chairman
Powell created a Media Ownership Working Group, which solicited
twelve studies on matters relevant to the ownership rules. Those
studies were issued in October 2002.40 In 2003, the FCC began its
deliberations on the ownership rules, and on June 2, 2003, the FCC
issued its new rules. The new rules allowed some cross ownership
among television, radio, and newspapers;41 retained the ban on
mergers among any of the top four national broadcast networks;42
33. See District of Columbia Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 5003, 113 Stat.
1501, 1501A-93 (1999) (“Within 180 days ... the ... Commission shall complete the first
biennial review required by section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996....”).
34. See 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 11,058, 11,072, ¶ 25 (2000).
35. 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
36. See id. at 1041-43.
37. Id. at 1043.
38. Id. at 1053.
39. Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
40. See Press Release, FCC, FCC Releases Twelve Studies on Current Media Marketplace
(Oct. 1, 2002) (on file with author) (reviewing the studies’ findings).
41. 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, ¶¶ 327, 368-371, 456-481 (outlining
guidelines for cross ownership rules).
42. Id. ¶ 592 (retaining the rule that permits common ownership of multiple broadcast
networks but prohibits “a merger between or among the ‘top-four’ networks, i.e., ABC, CBS,
Fox, and NBC”).
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kept the radio ownership caps at the same levels;43 increased the
number of local television stations a given entity could control;44
and, most controversially, increased the national television station
ownership limit from 35% to 45%.45
These changes sparked a firestorm. Editorialists, citizens’ groups,
and members of Congress expressed outrage.46 Opponents spanned
the political spectrum. The FCC’s changes managed to incur the
wrath of such disparate groups as the ACLU, the National Rifle
Association, the AFL-CIO, the Parents Television Council, the
National Organization for Women, the Family Research Council,
and MoveOn.org.47 Few government decisions manage to unite so
many disparate groups, but the FCC achieved that feat.
The opponents’ ire was particularly focused on the increase in the
national ownership limit. They saw this as a bad decision that had
to be reversed. And, as I noted at the outset of this Article, they
were partially successful: Congress voted to lower the limit to 35%,
then in conference the final number was 39%—and even the
increase from 35% to 39% provoked outrage.48
II. WHAT IS REALLY AT STAKE IN THE NATIONAL OWNERSHIP CAP?
The first question is that of the impact of raising the national
television station ownership cap. What are the likely ramifications
of this move? I begin with possible arguments against raising the
cap, and then consider arguments for it.
A. What Is Not Really at Stake
We can imagine (and opponents of an increase in the national
ownership cap have put forward) a number of arguments against
43. Id. ¶ 239 (keeping current numerical limits but modifying the way in which a radio
market is defined).
44. Id. ¶ 134 (“Our modified local TV ownership rule will permit an entity to have an
attributable interest in two television broadcast stations in markets with 17 or fewer
television stations; and up to three stations in markets with 18 or more television stations.”).
45. Id. ¶ 500 (concluding that the 35% cap could not be justified as in the public interest
and thus raising the cap to 45%).
46. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
47. See 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, at app. A.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 3-9.

2004]

NATIONAL TELEVISION OWNERSHIP CAP

449

the increase, but most of them have little relation to the increase
and thus are inapt. For instance, one possible argument against an
increase is that it will lead to a lower quantity of local news
programming. The idea is that large corporate owners would not air
as much local news programming as a small and, ideally, local
owner would.49
One point bears noting at the outset: insofar as this or any other
argument regarding the ownership rules is based in part on an
assumed distinction between local and non-local ownership, or
between small owners and large corporate owners, such a position
is undercut by the data on ownership. The vast majority of affiliates
are owned by significant corporate groups that own stations in
different markets.50 Simply stated, the ownership of most local
affiliates is not local. Or, as the networks put it in one of their
submissions to the FCC, such group owners “are no more ‘local’
to their non-headquartered markets” than are the networks.51
Arguments that rest on a contrary assumption are thus ill
founded.52
The point above does not refute the possibility that affiliates
might provide more news programming. The data, however, do.
Staff members of the FCC conducted a study to measure the
differences in news coverage provided by local stations owned by
broadcast networks versus independently owned local affiliates.
They found that network-owned stations broadcast 23% more local

49. See BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 216-18, 220-21 (6th ed. 2000)
(discussing current influences on decisions to print or broadcast specific material).
50. See Fox Entm’t Group, Inc. et al., Comments Before the FCC 38 (Jan. 2, 2003),
available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_
document=6513400697; Marius Schwartz & Daniel R. Vincent, The Television National
Ownership Cap and Localism: Reply Comments 2 (Feb. 3, 2003), available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513406930.
51. See Fox Entm’t Group, Inc. et al., supra note 50, at 38.
52. For instance, in defending media concentration limits, Ed Baker suggested that
“owners living in the community where the media product is distributed and owners closer
to journalistic/editorial process are generally likely to exercise more desirable decisionmaking
control and to be relatively more concerned with quality and less single-mindedly focused on
profit.” C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV. 839,
904 (2002). Assuming this to be true (Baker presents it as only a “suspicion[],” id.), it would
have little significance in the context of the national ownership rules, as most local affiliates
are not locally owned.
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news and public affairs programming per week than affiliates.53 A
separate study done by Economists, Inc. for Disney looked at two
different data sets, and in both cases found that network-owned
stations broadcast more local news and public affairs programming
than affiliates.54 The most that the affiliates could muster was that,
if one excluded the Fox stations, the quantity of local news and
public affairs programming was similar for network-owned stations
and affiliates.55 As the FCC concluded, however, there is little
reason to exclude the Fox stations.56 In any event, there is no basis
for concluding that ownership of stations by networks leads to less
local news programming, and there is ample data demonstrating the
converse.
This leads to a related argument: maybe network ownership
results in a greater quantity of news and public affairs programming, but lower quality. One study gives a bit of support for this
proposition. A study by the Project for Excellence in Journalism
developed its own criteria for determining quality (e.g., that it
“demonstrate enterprise and courage,” “be fair, balanced and
accurate,” and “be highly local”), and then sought to apply those
criteria to news programming provided by network-owned stations
and ordinary affiliates.57 The study found that the affiliates’ news
coverage was better on most of the components of quality that it
identified.58 As an analysis of that study pointed out, however, the
differences were not statistically significant.59 A more robust, and
53. Thomas C. Spavins et al., The Measurement of Local Television News and Public
Affairs Programs, available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC226838A12.doc (last visited May 19, 2004). Network-owned stations broadcasted 22.8 hours
per week, whereas non-network-owned stations broadcasted 18.5 hours per week. Id.
54. See 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, ¶¶ 565-567. Interestingly, the disparity
between network-owned stations and affiliates in terms of quantity of news programming was
greatest in the smallest markets. See id. ¶ 565.
55. See id. ¶ 575.
56. Id.
57. See Project for Excellence in Journalism, Does Ownership Matter in Local Television
News?: A Five-Year Study of Ownership and Quality (Feb. 17, 2003), available at http://www.
journalism.org/resources/research/reports/ownership/default.asp (last modified Apr. 29, 2003).
58. The study found that affiliates generally demonstrate somewhat more enterprise, cite
more sources, tend to be more local, and are more likely to air stories that affect the
community. It found that network-owned stations air more points of view and score better in
finding the larger implications of a story. Id.
59. See Bruce M. Owen et al., Economists Inc., The Project for Excellence in Journalism’s
PEJ Study of Ownership and Quality of Newscasts: A Critique 2 (Mar. 13, 2003), available
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reliable, result was obtained by the FCC study that also measured
quantity. This study looked at two measures of quality—awards and
ratings. It found that the ratings for network-owned stations and
affiliates were virtually identical, but that network-owned stations
received more awards—both those chosen by industry peers and the
Dupont Awards chosen by the Columbia School of Journalism—than
did affiliates.60 Both the local affiliates’ group and the networks
reinterpreted the data controlling for market size. This yielded
ambiguous results, with network-owned stations receiving more
awards chosen by industry peers but fewer Dupont awards.61 These
two studies thus gave little basis for finding a significant quality
difference between the network-owned stations and the affiliates. In
light of this, the FCC seems to have been on strong ground when it
stated that “[f]rom the data, we conclude that network-owned
stations provide local news and public affairs programming that is
at least equal, and may be superior, to that of affiliates.”62
Maybe the problem isn’t quantity or quality but viewpoint: with
fewer owners, viewers are more likely to see substantially similar
viewpoints expressed. This concern could be apt with regard to a
given entity owning two stations in a single market. If, for example,
a single entity owned two affiliates of the four major networks, there
might be a legitimate fear that members of the community who
relied on local broadcast television for their news might hear the
same perspective on local stories from both stations. The four
viewpoints we might expect from the four networks would shrink to
three. Assuming that such a reduction in viewpoints would occur if
one entity owned two local stations,63 it would still be largely
at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document= 6513782283
(last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
60. See Spavins et al., supra note 53, at 5-6.
61. See Bruce M. Owen et al., Economists, Inc., Economic Study H: News and Public
Affairs Programming: Television Broadcast Owned and Operated Stations Compared to
Network Affiliated Stations 10 (Jan. 2003), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513400699 (last visited Oct. 19, 2004);
Schwartz & Vincent, supra note 50, at 3-4.
62. 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, ¶ 574.
63. There is some reason to doubt this assumption. One of the studies commissioned by
the FCC examined the “slant” of the coverage of the 2000 election by newspapers and
television stations that were in the same market and had the same owner. See DAVID
PRITCHARD, VIEWPOINT DIVERSITY IN CROSS-OWNED NEWSPAPERS AND TELEVISION STATIONS:
A STUDY OF NEWS COVERAGE OF THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN (FCC, Working Paper No.
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irrelevant to the national ownership rules because the rules have
nothing to do with ownership of multiple local stations in the same
market.64 The national television station ownership rules prevent
the owner of a station in a given market (e.g., New York City), from
buying a station in a different market (e.g., Atlanta). The rules do
not change the total number of owners in either New York or
Atlanta. If viewers were hearing X viewpoints on local issues when
the national limit was 35%, they should hear X viewpoints on those
issues after the limit was raised and one affiliate was bought by a
network.65
It bears noting that the trade groups for local affiliates—the
Network Affiliated Stations Alliance and the National Association
of Broadcasters—suggested that it is possible for national ownership
caps to have some impact on viewpoint diversity.66 They argued
2, 2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226838A7.doc.
The study found that “in five of the 10 newspaper-television combinations studied, the overall
slant of the coverage broadcast by a company’s television station was noticeably different from
the overall slant of the coverage provided by the same company’s newspaper,” and in the five
others there was no noticeable difference. Id. Given the fact that each newspaper and
television station had the same owner, we might have expected that the editorial slant of both
entities would have been identical. But that was not the case in half of the admittedly small
sample.
64. See 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, ¶ 535 (“The national television cap ...
ensures a larger total number of station owners nationwide, but it has no meaningful impact
on viewpoint diversity within local markets.”).
65. See also Amendment of Section 73.3555 [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636]
of the Commission’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television
Broadcast Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, ¶ 32 (1984). The Amendment states that:
[V]iewers in San Francisco, St. Louis and Philadelphia each judge viewpoint
diversity by the extent of sources of ideas available to them, not by whether
those same or other ideas are available in other broadcast markets. Moreover,
it is apparent that restrictions on the ownership of radio and TV stations at a
nationwide level bear no necessary relationship to the number of independent
viewpoints in a particular local market, nor does relaxation or abolition of this
rule affect the Commission’s local ownership restrictions. Consequently, the lack
of relevance of the rule to local viewpoint diversity persuades us that elimination
of the national ownership rule is unlikely to have an adverse impact on the
number of independent viewpoints available to consumers.
Id.
66. These groups’ main argument was that the national ownership caps would limit the
effectiveness of affiliates’ preemptions. See infra Part II.B. But they also suggested that the
cap can affect viewpoint diversity. See Marius Schwartz & Daniel R. Vincent, The Television
National Ownership Cap and Localism 12-13 (Jan. 2, 2003), available at http://www.nab.
org/newsroom/pressrel/filings/NASAAtt1203.pdf.
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that, even though a viewer in a given local market would see the
same number of viewpoints regardless of the national cap level, that
viewer might be affected by the national cap insofar as she reads or
hears about programming offered by local stations in other cities.67
The idea is that if, say, the local NBC station in city A is owned by
a different entity than a station in city B, people in each city might
be more likely to learn of a new viewpoint than would be the case if
both stations were owned by NBC. A viewer might, for example, be
exposed to a new viewpoint by hearing from a friend or relative
about the viewpoint presented by a local television program. But
this hypothesis relies on a number of contestable assumptions, and
there is no evidence for it.68 Notably, the affiliates do not argue
otherwise; they merely suggest that this is a possible scenario. We
could imagine that viewpoint diversity would be affected by the
national ownership limit, but there is little basis for doing so.
The difference between the impact of the local ownership cap and
the national ownership cap is central to other potential arguments
against the latter. For instance, this difference undercuts any
argument that an increase in the national ownership cap will lead
to less diversity in types of programs. An example of such program
diversity would arise when, in a given time slot, one station showed
a program on sports and another showed a program on the arts. As
with viewpoint diversity, there is no reason to expect that increasing
the national ownership limit will have any effect on program
diversity. In either case, there will be X television stations in the
local market showing X programs. There is no a priori reason to
expect that changing the identity of one or more owners will lead to
less program diversity. In fact, and perhaps ironically, the main
change in ownership rules that might have a chance of increasing
program diversity would be to allow one entity to own all the
stations in a given market.69 If viewing preferences are skewed (e.g.,
67. Id.
68. The FCC noted the same possibility in its 2003 order, but rejected the argument in
light of its speculativeness. See 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, ¶ 536 (noting the
set of assumptions necessary for the affiliates’ theory regarding a possible impact on
viewpoint diversity to be plausible, and concluding that “[t]he national cap cannot be justified
by reference to such a hypothetical scenario as this”).
69. For demonstrations of this as an economic model, see Peter O. Steiner, Program
Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability of Competition in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q.J.
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at a given hour 70% of viewers want to watch sports, 20% want to
watch entertainment news, and 10% want to watch an arts
program) and there are four local broadcasters, we would not expect
any of them to broadcast an arts program.70 Only if there were a
monopolist would we expect one of these four stations to show the
arts program.71 In any event, all of this is far removed from the
national ownership rules, which simply allow companies to buy
single stations in several different markets.
But is it not true that increasing the national ownership cap will
lead an already concentrated market to become even more concentrated, and isn’t such concentration a major problem?72 Let’s unpack
that a bit. Concentration in the abstract is not very significant.
What matters is concentration that distorts a particular market. We
immediately confront a tricky question, however, that the previous
discussion highlights: Exactly what market will fewer station
owners harm?

ECON. 194, 206 (1952) (presenting a model that shows how “a series of competing firms, each
striving to maximize its number of listeners, will fail to achieve either the industry or the
social good”). For a demonstration of this as an empirical reality, see Lisa George, What’s Fit
to Print: The Effect of Ownership Concentration on Product Variety in Daily Newspaper
Markets 23-28 (Aug. 1, 2001) (describing the increase in total content variety that results
from increased ownership concentration in markets for daily newspapers), available at
http://www.arxiv.org/ftp/cs/papers/0108/0108014.pdf.
70. We would expect three stations to show sports programs in the relevant time slot, with
each station expecting to gain 23% of the viewers, and the fourth station to show
entertainment news, expecting to gain 20% of the viewers.
Note that if there were only three stations, we would not expect any of them to show arts
programming or entertainment news. This is because each of the three would show sports,
expecting to gain 23% of the viewers.
71. See Jack H. Beebe, Institutional Structure and Program Choices in Television Markets,
91 Q.J. ECON. 15, 35-36 (1977) (presenting a model to illustrate the circumstances under
which monopoly will produce greater diversity in programming); Steiner, supra note 69.
72. Many of the comments to the FCC stated broad opposition to media consolidation. For
example, Media Tank organized a massive e-mail campaign that encouraged the FCC to
retain all the ownership limits to limit “the market power of already huge companies in the
broadcast industry.” Media Tank, Participate! Use This Form to Send a Message to the FCC
and Other Key Decision-Makers, at http://www.mediatank.org/fcc_webform2.html (last visited
Sept. 5, 2004) (form e-mail to FCC). The form e-mail then argues that “[t]he right to carry on
informed debate and discussion of current events is part of the founding philosophy of our
nation.... If the FCC allows our media outlets to merge, our ability to have open, informed
discussion with a wide variety of viewpoints will be compromised.” Id.
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The markets for local broadcast stations are local, not national.73
Local broadcast stations in San Francisco do not compete with those
in Chicago. Indeed, in terms of actual viewing, national ownership
caps have no obvious relevance to local stations. There is no
evidence that some people move from one city to another in order to
get better local broadcast television, and there is otherwise little
basis for believing that the ownership of NBC stations in San
Francisco and Chicago would make any difference to the viewers in
either city.
So in what markets will an increase in national ownership caps
lead to unhealthy concentration? One possible nominee is advertising markets. Local stations generally sell time to local advertisers,
however, and the advertisers have no reason to care whether the
station with which they are negotiating owns stations in other
markets. The fact that a local station is owned by a network does
not increase the value of the local advertisement; the relevant
consideration for advertisers is the market position of that local
station. And networks contract with national advertisers, who have
little reason to care how many stations the network owns as long as
their advertisements are played over all the stations on the
network.74
There is a wrinkle, though. As the affiliates noted in their
submissions to the FCC, local television stations sell advertising
through agencies, and those agencies sometimes aggregate the
available advertising time on local stations in different markets in
order to allow national advertisers to buy spot advertising that can
approximate a national advertisement on a single network.75 There
is, however, conflicting evidence as to whether network and spot
advertisements are substitutes.76 And it is far from clear that
73. As I discuss in more detail in Part III, it makes little sense to look at broadcast
television in isolation from cable and satellite, but I leave that assumption undisturbed for
now.
74. Note that advertisers do care if the networks fail to get a given program—and
therefore its advertisements—carried by all the network’s affiliates, as that makes the
advertisement less valuable to them. This highlights the importance of preemption, which I
discuss below. See infra Part II.B.
75. See Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters and the Network Affiliated Stations Alliance,
Comments Before the FCC 59-63 (Jan. 2, 2003), available at http://www.nab.org/newsroom/
PressRel/Filings?NASA1203.pdf.
76. Compare Alvin J. Silk et al., Intermedia Substitutability and Market Demand by
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network ownership of more local stations will change any advertising practices. As the FCC noted in rejecting this concern about spot
advertising, there is reason to expect that network-owned stations
will accept spot advertising just as readily as affiliates do, and for
the same reason—to maximize their revenue.77 Importantly, the
relevant empirical evidence supports the FCC’s position. Recall that
in 1996 the FCC raised the national ownership cap from 25% to
35%,78 and there was an increase in ownership of stations by CBS,
Fox, and NBC. But the annual growth rate for national spot
advertising has been fairly steady since 1990, and did not diminish
after 1996.79 In addition, one of the studies commissioned by the
FCC suggests that national caps do not limit the available outlets
for advertising, as reflected by advertising rates. It looked at the
effect of national concentration of radio ownership on advertising
rates, and found that national concentration did not increase local
advertising prices.80 In fact, it found that “a greater presence of
large national owners in a local market appears to decrease the
advertising rates paid by national and regional advertising agencies.”81 As with viewpoint diversity, multiple ownership of local
stations in a given market might make a difference in advertising
markets, but multiple ownership of stations in different markets
appears to make little, if any, difference.
Perhaps the real significance of lifting national ownership caps
is that it will lead to a concentrated program acquisition market.
The idea is that there will no longer be enough buyers of programs
to constitute a competitive acquisition market, which will in turn
allow the few remaining buyers to squeeze the program producers.82
National Advertisers, 20 REV. INDUS. ORG. 323 (2002) (finding that they are not substitutes),
with B.D. McCullough & Tracy Waldon, The Substitutability of Network and National Spot
Television Advertising, 37 Q.J. BUS. & ECON. 3 (1998) (finding that they are substitutes).
77. See 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, ¶ 528.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
79. See JONATHAN LEVY ET AL., BROADCAST TELEVISION: SURVIVOR IN A SEA OF
COMPETITION 13 tbl.4 (FCC, Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper No. 37, 2002), available
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226838A22.doc.
80. Keith Brown & George Williams, Consolidation and Advertising Prices in Local Radio
Markets 1 (Sept. 2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/
DOC-226838A9.doc.
81. Id. at 1. Presumably, this is due to the increased ability of national advertisers to
engage in one-stop shopping when there is greater national concentration.
82. E.g., Am. Fed’n of Television & Radio Artists & Writers Guild of Am., Comments
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This fear is not illogical. An increase in the national ownership cap
would permit fewer companies to own the affiliates of any given
network. That could mean fewer buyers of programming,83 potentially reducing competition in the program acquisition market to
unhealthy levels.
The ownership of broadcast television stations, however, is fairly
unconcentrated, and the impact of a move from a 35% cap to a 45%
cap on national broadcast ownership would be quite modest. Even
if we examine the four major broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, Fox,
and NBC) in isolation as constituting a market, that resulting
market would not be concentrated. None of the four major networks
currently owns as much as 10% of the total number of big four
stations, and that number would rise to only 11 or 12% if the cap is
raised to 45%.84 Moreover, these numbers overstate the significance
of the national ownership cap. In reality, the affiliates of the four
major broadcast networks are in the same market as other
broadcasters (e.g., the WB network)—not to mention cable
networks—which highlights that the market is even more competitive than the numbers above suggest. More important, the number
of stations owned and the percentage of households reached by those
stations tell us fairly little about market power. What really matters
is market share.85 And the audience shares of each of the four major
Before the FCC (Jan. 2, 2003), available at, http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
native_or_pdf=pdf&id_ document=6513400862; Caucus for Television Producers, Writers &
Dirs., A Response to the Federal Communications Commission Media Ownership Working
Paper Number 5, Program Diversity and the Program Selection Process (Dec. 20, 2003),
available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document
=6513398656; The Coalition for Program Diversity, Comments Before the FCC (Jan. 2, 2003),
available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_ document=
6513402090.
83. Whether this would happen in reality would depend on whether the new owner
centralized program purchases.
84. This follows from the facts that none of the networks owns stations reaching more
than 39% of television households, and that networks disproportionately own stations in large
markets (so that the percentage of stations owned is lower than the percentage of households
reached). With four networks, the ownership of each network represents only a fourth of the
major broadcast stations (or about 10% of the total number of major network stations), and
even less if you add the three smaller broadcast networks.
85. After all, my website is available to everyone who has access to the Internet, but that
fact alone tells us nothing about its market power.
The traditional measurement of concentration is the sum of the squares of the market
share of the firms in the market, known as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. See Stephen
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broadcast networks is below 15% of the audience it reaches, and
those shares are declining.86 A network that owned stations
reaching 45% of households would thus capture less than 6.75% of
the national audience.87
Simply stated, the program acquisition market is fairly
unconcentrated, and it is becoming less concentrated as more cable
channels become viable bidders for programming (because they are
gaining viewers).88 More importantly, there is no reason to believe
that an increase in the national ownership cap would lead to
unhealthy levels of competition—or anything close to it. As the FCC
noted in its 2003 order, even “worst case,” “highly unrealistic”
assumptions of the effects of increasing the ownership cap would not
justify keeping the cap in order to protect competition.89
That still leaves the possibility of some concentration, even if it
would not be enough to justify regulation. The fear might be that,
even without significant concentration, the big buyers will prefer
their own programming and thus knock other producers out of
business. Ownership limits are a poor proxy for protecting nonnetwork producers, however. With respect to each local station, the
owner (whoever that might be) has an interest in purchasing the
programming that will most appeal to the local audience. If our goal
is that broadcasters buy programming from non-network producers,
the obvious way to achieve this is to mandate that they do so, rather
than hope that more owners will translate into more purchases from
non-network producers. Indeed, the FCC once did have such a
mandate, via the Prime Time Access Rule (PTAR) and its rules
limiting networks’ ability to syndicate the programming they
carried.90 The PTAR limited the major broadcast networks (then
Calkins, The New Merger Guidelines and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 71 CAL. L. REV.
402, 408-15 (1983); Albert O. Hirschman, The Paternity of an Index, 54 AM. ECON. REV. 761
(1964).
86. See Cynthia Littleton, 2003-04 Primetime Wrap, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, May 28,
2004, available at http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr/television/feature_display.
jsp?vnu_content_id=1000521355; infra notes 153-57.
87. This number is obtained by multiplying 45% by 15%.
88. 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, ¶¶ 120-124.
89. Id. ¶ 523.
90. The latter were known as “finsyn,” which was shorthand for “financial interest and
syndication rules.” They were adopted in Competition and Responsibility in Network
Television Broadcasting, 23 F.C.C.2d 382 (1970) (report and order), aff’d, Mt. Mansfield
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ABC, CBS, and NBC) to supplying their affiliates with no more than
three hours of programming during the four hour “prime time”
block.91 The financial interest and syndication rules prevented ABC,
CBS, and NBC from either acquiring profit-sharing positions in
network programs produced by independent companies or licensing
to independent stations the rights to show reruns of program series
that had concluded their network runs.92 The former regulation was
designed to ensure that non-network producers could sell directly to
network affiliates, and the latter was designed to prevent networks
from using their power either to pay excessively low fees to nonnetwork producers or to prevent competition from reruns. Both
rules thus sought to directly help independent producers and to
limit the ability of broadcast networks to squeeze them out of
existence.93
In any event, there are a number of empirical problems with this
assertion that higher national ownership limits lead to fewer
producers. First, the evidence shows that the rules that did prevent
networks from buying their own programming exclusively (the
PTAR and finsyn rules) actually tended to constrict the number of
program sources. As Judge Posner suggested in his opinion on these
rules, the networks’ inability to participate in this programming
hurt small producers the most, because they are the ones who
needed the networks’ financial support in order to get their
programs made.94 Posner noted that “[t]he sale of syndication rights
Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 489 (2d Cir. 1971). The rules were revised in Broadcast
Services; Financial Interest and Syndication Rules, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,242 (June 6, 1991), then
they were again amended in Broadcast Services; Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial
Interest Rules, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,207 (Dec. 9, 1991) (subsequently codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
The finsyn rules were repealed in Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules,
8 F.C.C.R. 3282, 3282-84 (1993).
91. Competition and Responsibility in Network Television Broadcasting, 23 F.C.C.2d at
384, app. I at 402.
92. See id.
93. Groups advocating for greater source diversity (i.e., more program producers)
generally tailored their arguments away from arguing against a higher national ownership
cap, instead of being in favor of structural changes resembling a modified, scaled down version
of the finsyn and PTAR rules. See, e.g., The Coalition for Program Diversity, supra note 82,
at 24 (advocating that a requirement that independent producers provide at least 25% of
network programming “would limit, if not prevent, the diminished diversity caused by cross
ownership or the undesirable further relaxation of rhe [sic] 35% broadcast cap”).
94. Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1046 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that
many small producers were hurt under the rules because they were unable to shift risk to

460

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:439

to a network would enable a producer to shift risk to a larger, more
diversified entity [the network] presumptively better able to bear
it.”95 The FCC also reviewed the data and reached a similar
conclusion.96
Second, the national ownership cap has been raised in the past,97
and yet there is no evidence to support the proposition that these
increases resulted in fewer producers. In fact, the limited empirical
data suggests that increases and decreases in the number of
program producers have not been related to the national ownership
cap.98
B. The Importance of Preemption
If raising the national television station ownership cap does not
change the quantity or quality of local programming, diminish
viewpoint diversity, or create unhealthy market power vis-à-vis
local stations’ viewers, advertisers, or program producers, then what
difference does the ownership limit make? The answer to this
question is that raising the ownership cap changes the relationship
between the national networks and their affiliates—specifically by
diminishing the likelihood and effectiveness of local stations’
decisions to reject network programming.
Indeed, this was the main argument made by the central
opponents of an increase in the national ownership cap—the
network affiliates. As I noted above, there were over 750,000
comments submitted to the FCC, but most of these were short form
letters that did not discuss any of the limits in detail.99 For those
comments that did discuss the limits, most lumped the national
ownership limit with other ownership limits and then presented the
arguments discussed in the previous section.100 Few commenters
networks by selling syndication rights).
95. Id.
96. See Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, 8 F.C.C.R. 3282, 3286
(1993).
97. The cap was raised most recently in 1996. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
98. See MARA EINSTEIN, PROGRAM DIVERSITY AND THE PROGRAM SELECTION PROCESS ON
BROADCAST NETWORK TELEVISION 36-37 (FCC, Working Paper No. 5, 2002), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226838A10.pdf.
99. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Rev. Robert Chase, Remarks at FCC Press Roundtable (May 27, 2003) (“The
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focused in a serious way on the national ownership limit and the
arguments for and against it, and many of those relied on
conclusory statements and bald assertions.101 But two groups (and
only two) commissioned studies by economists to establish the basis
for each side’s position, and then engaged in a sustained discussion
of the impact of raising the national limits. Unsurprisingly, these
were the two groups that had the most at stake in the ownership
cap: the national broadcast networks (represented by NBC, CBS,
and Fox)102 and the local affiliates (represented by their trade
groups, the Network Affiliated Stations Alliance and the National
Association of Broadcasters).103 Networks and the affiliates’ trade
groups have long been the main players in debates over the national
ownership cap (and the main lobbyists), and they took on that role
in this debate as well.104 In contrast to the anecdotal approach of
relaxation of ownership rules limits diversity and adds to the burden of media ownership and
decision-making by women, people of color, linguistic minorities and others who seek a public
voice in our society.”), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_
or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6514182066.
101. See, e.g., Don Schellhardt, What Section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
Actually Requires 13 (Jan. 31, 2003), reprinted in The Amherst Alliance, Reply Comments
Before the FCC 13 (Feb. 1, 2003) (“Given the losses of broadcasting jobs from ‘market
consolidation’—plus the disappearance of many entrepreneurs, and/or ‘Mom and Pop’ teams,
... further media ownership deregulation is likely to further undercut the nation’s stated goals
of full employment, upward mobility for all who are willing to work....”), available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document= 6513406342.
102. See, e.g., Fox Entm’t Group, Inc. et al., supra note 50 (first of twenty-seven joint
comments). ABC, which is owned by Disney, filed separate comments that did not consider
the rules in any detail. See Walt Disney Co., Comments Before the FCC (Jan. 2, 2003),
available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id
_document=6513400837 (advocating deregulation). ABC did join the other networks in
advocating against the implementation of new finsyn rules. Ex parte Notice (Apr. 25, 2003)
(No. 02-277), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_
document=6513984356; see also Letter from Jared S. Sher, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
& Flom LLP, to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, FCC (Apr. 25, 2003), available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513984354.
103. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters and The Network Affiliated Stations Alliance,
supra note 75 (first of 11 joint comments).
104. Many non-network station groups filed comments separately from NAB and NASA.
These comments rarely argued against the national ownership caps; instead, the comments
advocated repeal or modification of the cross ownership or duopoly rules. See, e.g., Belo Corp.,
Comments Before the FCC (Jan. 2, 2003) (arguing against duopoly and cross ownership rules),
available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_
or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513400819; Media Gen., Inc., Comments Before the FCC vii-viii
(Jan. 2, 2003) (arguing that because diversity of ownership is not linked to viewpoint
diversity, cross ownership rules should be repealed), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/
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most commenters, the networks and the local affiliates sought to
present a theoretical and empirical grounding for their position, and
solicited studies by economists for that purpose.
The central argument in the affiliates’ submissions was that an
increase in the national ownership cap would limit the likelihood
and effectiveness of affiliates’ preemption of network programming.
According to the affiliates, the battle was not about affiliates’
profits, but instead about their ability to shape the programming
that their viewers saw.105 And the main argument in the networks’
responses was that there was no reason to believe that the national
ownership cap would have any significant effect on preemptions.106
This was also the focus of the discussion of the national ownership limit in the FCC. The central reason for the national ownership
limit, according to the FCC, is “to preserve a body of independentlyowned affiliates” as a means of protecting localism.107 The FCC
prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513411104; see also Newspaper Ass’n
of Am., Comments Before the FCC (Jan. 2, 2003) (advocating repeal of newspaper/broadcast
cross ownership rules), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/ retrieve.
cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513400613. Most consumer groups, in turn, directed
the majority of their comments to responding to those rules. See, e.g., Consumer Fed’n of Am.
et al., Comments Before the FCC (Jan. 2, 2003) (exhaustively reviewing the media landscape,
but focusing on the effects of consolidation as a whole), available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve. cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document= 6513400922.
105. The Schwartz and Vincent study summarized their points as follows:
While network-affiliate disputes over the Cap are sometimes portrayed as “just
a fight about money,” economic analysis contradicts this portrayal for two
reasons. First, as noted above, the Cap alters the choices of stations and, hence,
the programming viewed by local communities. Second, the Cap confers no
obvious power to a typical affiliate in negotiations with its network, and
therefore appears to have no systematic effect on boosting affiliate profits.
Indeed, it may well reduce the profit the affiliate could collect through selling
the station to the network (or through unconstrained contracting).
Schwartz & Vincent, supra note 66, at 1.
106. Fox Entm’t Group, Inc. et al., supra note 50, at 39-40; see also Bruce M. Owen et al.,
Economists, Inc., Economic Study G: Preemption by O&Os Compared to Affiliates (finding
that the difference in preemptions by network-owned stations as opposed to affiliates was
relatively small, and “of little policy consequence”), available at http:// gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/
ecfs/retrieve. cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id _document=6513400699 (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
107. 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, ¶ 546. The FCC did articulate one other
justification for a national ownership cap (though not specifically for the 35% cap versus the
45% cap): that having such a cap will encourage innovation in the rollout of digital
broadcasting. See id. ¶ 532 (“[W]e conclude that a national television cap is necessary to
preserve a number of separately-owned television station groups, including non-network
groups, that will increase the types of digital transition experiments and ultimately facilitate

2004]

NATIONAL TELEVISION OWNERSHIP CAP

463

elaborated that such affiliates would promote localism by preempting network programming in favor of “programming better suited to
its community” and by collectively influencing network programming.108 The most vociferous FCC opponent of the increase in the
national ownership cap, Commissioner Michael Copps, similarly
focused on the importance of preemption as a means of allowing
local communities to veto unsuitable programming.109
a rapid and efficient transition to digital broadcast television.”). The FCC presented little
evidence in support of this conclusion, and it seems fair to say that it was not central to the
FCC’s decision. Not only was the discussion brief and the conclusion modest, but in its briefs
in the lawsuit brought challenging the FCC’s 2003 order, in which the affiliates contended
that the FCC improperly increased the national ownership cap to 45% and the networks
contended that the FCC improperly retained any cap at all, the FCC does not mention the
innovation argument and instead relies exclusively on affiliates’ role in influencing network
programming. See Brief for Respondents at 92-103, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2003
U.S. App. LEXIS 18390 (3d Cir. 2003) (No. 03-3388).
It also bears noting that the FCC’s innovation argument is problematic because it assumes,
and relies on, the desirability of a transition to digital broadcasting. It is understandable that
the FCC so assumes: the Commission is more than ten years into a transition that has gone
poorly and is embarrassingly far behind schedule. See STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL.,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 332-60 (2001). For the sake of its own credibility (the
FCC was the main entity that pushed for this transition), and because its official policy is one
of helping broadcasting remain viable, the FCC wants to push the transition forward. See
Eugene Rome, Comment, Regulatory Overreaching: Why the FCC Is Exceeding Its Authority
in Implementing a Phase-In Plan for DTV Tuners, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 533, 538-48
(2003). But there is little reason for the rest of us to assume the wisdom of pushing the
transition forward. On the contrary, abandoning the transition to digital broadcasting would
save a massive amount of money while imposing few costs. Cable and satellite are making the
transition to digital transmissions much more quickly even as a growing majority of
households receive their signals via cable or satellite, so the benefit of digital broadcast (as
opposed to digital transmission of cable and satellite signals) is fairly small. See infra Part III.
108. 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, ¶ 546; see also 2002 Biennial Regulatory
Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted
Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,932, 13,941
(2003) (Statement of Michael K. Powell, Comm’r):
We found that a national TV ownership limit on the percentage of potential TV
households the networks may reach continues to be necessary to promote
localism. We determined that a national ownership cap serves localism by
preserving a balance of bargaining power between the networks and their
affiliates; ensuring the affiliates play a meaningful role in the selection of
programming that serves the interests of their local audiences.
Id.
109. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,951, 13,960 (2003) (Copps, Comm’r,
dissenting):
The record evidence demonstrates, among other things, that independently
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In fact, one striking aspect of both the network affiliates’ study
and the FCC’s defense of its decision to keep a national ownership
cap (in response to the networks’ arguments that there should be no
cap at all) is that neither relies on any of the arguments I listed in
the previous section.110 Indeed, the FCC considered, and rejected,
each of the arguments regarding diversity and competition laid out
in the previous section.111 Instead, both the affiliates’ study and the
FCC argued that the central justification for the ownership cap was
as an aid to localism—because it would leave more affiliates with
the opportunity to preempt (on the grounds that network-owned
stations preempt less than do affiliates), and because it would make
the preemptions of the remaining stations more effective. The main
players in the debate—the affiliates, the networks, and the
FCC—agreed that the national ownership cap would not change
bargaining power, but instead would change the likelihood of
preemption (for the stations that were bought by a network) and the
effectiveness of preemption (for the affiliates that were not bought).
Simply stated, the main interested parties as well as the main
government actors all recognized that the central issue in the
national television station ownership cap was the effect it would
have on affiliates’ preemptions of network programming.112
Of course, the fact that the main opponents of raising the cap and
the FCC focused on this issue does not mean that they were correct
in suggesting that raising the national ownership cap would limit

owned affiliates are better able to preempt network programming networks
based on community standards and needs; that the 35 percent cap ensures a
critical mass of affiliates necessary to perform this role effectively; and that a
substantial majority of affiliates are experiencing increasing pressure from the
networks not to preempt network programming. Yet, the majority largely
ignores this evidence and arbitrarily chooses a number that tips the balance
further in favor of the national networks and away from the local stations.
Id.
110. The one exception is that the Schwartz and Vincent study suggested that the
ownership limit can advance viewpoint diversity. See supra note 66. As I noted above, the
affiliates presented no evidentiary basis for this suggestion, and it played a small role in their
submissions. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
111. See supra Part II.A.
112. See Matthew Rose & Joe Flint, Behind Media-Ownership Fight, An Old Power
Struggle is Raging: As TV Networks Get Bigger, Their Local Affiliates Fear a Loss of
Autonomy—A ‘Plott Hound,’ Takes on FCC, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2003, at A1.
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preemptions. In order to understand why the cap affects preemptions, we first need to understand why affiliates preempt at all.
1. Why, and When, Do Preemptions Occur?
The interests of affiliates and networks are not aligned. Their
interests diverge in two ways. The first flows from the fact that their
broad sources of profit are different. Networks make money by
selling advertising time during programs they air across the nation.
Their profits depend on the hours that they program (e.g., prime
time). All the hours that affiliates program (e.g., mid-afternoon until
prime time) do not directly benefit the networks, but they are
essential to the affiliates, as that is when the affiliates make much
of their money. Networks regard affiliates’ profitability during nonnetwork hours as helpful but not essential. What is essential to each
side is to have profitable programming—and the source of profits for
networks is different from the source of profits for affiliates.
Affiliates benefit when the network is strong, but that benefit is
fairly diffuse. What is of immediate benefit to affiliates is the
advertising revenue they receive, most of which comes from the
programming that they control (although some comes from local
spots inserted in network programming).113
113. See 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, ¶ 514.
Broadcast television networks have a single, strategic focus, namely, the
maximization of the number of television viewers that are attracted to mass
audience and niche audience programming. This strategic focus is crucial to
broadcast television networks, since the sale of audiences to national advertisers
provides their only stream of revenue from broadcast operations in contrast to
cable networks which may receive both advertiser and subscriber revenue. By
contrast, local broadcast television stations pursue a more complex business
strategy as licensed broadcast facilities. First, the local station seeks to
maximize the size of its audience it attracts within its local television market.
If the local station is a network affiliate, then the local station will promote the
network’s program schedule together with syndicated programming the station
may acquire to help fill out its daily program schedule. Second, the local station
will also promote its own locally-produced programming, such as news and
public affairs programming, that it believes is responsive to issues or viewer
preferences in the communities served by the station. Station management may
vary the allocation of time devoted to any particular type of programming,
including network programming, to respond to emerging preferences or news
events in the communities located in its local television market.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Second, and more importantly for our purposes, even with respect
to network programming, the interests of affiliates and networks
are not aligned. Networks have an interest in aggregating viewers
around the country for their programs. Some advertisers want to
advertise nationally; that is why the networks were created in the
first place.114 Stated differently, broadcasters realized that they
could receive more revenue for a single national advertising package
than for 200 local ones, and that is why networks arose.115
Affiliates receive relatively little benefit from the networks’
national advertising. The national advertising revenue benefits the
network as a whole, but for a given affiliate that benefit is quite
diffuse and attenuated. Affiliates directly benefit from the advertising they sell.
The problem for the networks is that on some occasions a local
station will gain a higher viewership if it preempts the network’s
program and substitutes another one. The substitute may be more
popular in that community, and therefore more attractive to the
affiliate. But the network loses, because its program is worth less to
its advertisers. Importantly, the affiliate may make this decision
even though the cost to the network is greater than the benefit to
the affiliate. The reason for this is simple: for affiliates, the costs of
preemption are widely shared and therefore diffuse, but the benefits
are concentrated on them. They might well prefer to preempt (and
both satisfy their local viewers and bring in additional revenue)
even if it harms the network, because they alone receive the benefits
of that preemption.
This divergence would exist even if an affiliate had to share its
revenue from its substitute program with its network in the same
way that it shares revenue from network programming: If Show A
would provide the local station with X dollars and Show B would
provide it with X minus Y dollars, then it will air Show A, even if
Show B is much more popular in every other market. Show B’s

114. See Schwartz & Vincent, supra note 66, at 3 (“[T]he network’s defining feature is its
role as a supplier of a national programming schedule to stations in numerous markets, and
its income from national advertisers depends on obtaining widespread and synchronized
‘clearance’ of its program schedule.”).
115. See id.
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national popularity will not have much impact on the affiliate if it
is not popular locally.
In fact the situation is even more divergent, in that FCC rules
limit the networks’ ability to interfere with affiliates’ preemption
decisions once they have the contractual right to preempt. These
rules—in particular the Time Optioning and Right to Reject
rules116—have been construed to allow networks and affiliates to
bargain over the number of hours an affiliate will be allowed to
preempt, but not to allow networks to penalize stations by, for
example, seizing some of the advertising revenue the local stations
receive when they preempt.117
Affiliates thus have an interest in preempting because their profit
calculation differs from that of the network. Any given local
broadcaster might be tempted to defect when it can make more
money in a given instance. Due to the collective action problem
(affiliates that preempt gain all of the benefit of the preemption and
pay only a small portion of the long-term cost), we can expect
affiliates to engage in such behavior even if it is not in the interest
of the network as a whole.118
Significantly, the different positions and incentives of local
affiliates and networks give rise to another reason why local
116. FCC Broadcast Radio Services 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(d)-(e) (2003). Subsection (e) reads:
(e) Right to reject programs. No license shall be granted to a television broadcast
station having any contract, arrangement, or understanding, express or implied,
with a network organization which, with respect to programs offered or already
contracted for pursuant to an affiliation contract, prevents or hinders the station
from:
(1) rejecting or refusing network programs which the station reasonably
believes to be unsatisfactory or unsuitable or contrary to the public
interest, or
(2) Substituting a program which, in the station’s opinion, is of greater local
or national importance.
117. Bruce M. Owen et al., Affiliate Clearances, Retransmission Agreements, Bargaining
Power and the Media Ownership Rules 10 (Apr. 21, 2003), available at http://gullfoss2.
fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513983376; see Schwartz &
Vincent, supra note 66, at 8.
118. See Owen et al., supra note 117, at 10 (“The [local] station’s private profit calculation
whether to clear or preempt a particular show does not take into account the economic loss
that preemption imposes on other network affiliates and on the network.”); Schwartz &
Vincent, supra note 66, at 8 (“In making its individual profit calculation when rejecting a
network’s show, a station does not take into account the full harm that such rejection causes
to the effectiveness of network advertising, and hence to the network’s revenue and incentives
to invest in programming.”).
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affiliates might want to preempt—to influence network programming. If a network airs programming that an affiliate believes will
be unpopular in its viewing community, the affiliate has two reasons
to preempt it. The first is the collective action issue noted above,
and the second is that it can send a message to the network that it
should stop airing the program. Refusing to air a network program
reduces the program’s revenue (advertisers will pay less, because
they will reach fewer viewers) but does not reduce its cost (which
has already been paid), so the network’s profit declines. Every lost
viewer represents lost revenue.119 Thus, if a network is choosing
between Show A, which will be carried by all its affiliates, and Show
B, which will be rejected by some of them, it will choose Show A
unless Show B is so popular in the markets where it is carried that
the extra revenue is greater than the revenue lost to preemption.
The net result is that local stations know that they can influence
programming choices by their rejection of network shows.
If a network program will garner low ratings in every market,
there is little need for local stations to send any signal via preemption: the show will likely be cancelled anyway. The situation in
which affiliates’ rejections can actually affect network behavior will
arise instead when a program is popular in some markets. If a show
does well in most markets and adequately in others, the network
will likely keep it. If the show does well in most markets but is
preempted in a few others, that may be enough to doom it.120
Under what circumstances, though, would a show do well in most
markets but be so unwelcome in a few markets that it would be
preempted in them? The main situation where this arises is in
119. I discuss this point in greater detail infra, notes 139 and 147-48 and accompanying
text.
120. See Owen et al., supra note 117, at 11.
Networks compete to sell commercial advertising based partly on their
reach—the percentage of all television households that are available to view the
commercial. Even a small loss of geographic coverage can put a network at a
significant competitive disadvantage in this competition. For many years, for
example, ABC had great difficulty competing on equal terms with CBS and NBC
because it was only a few percentage points lower in its reach. Therefore,
stations that collectively can impose even modest reach reductions on a network
can succeed in blocking transmission of an offensive program to all affiliated
stations.
Id.
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programming that affiliates consider to be unsuitable for their
communities—and that judgment of unsuitability is almost always
based on the perceived offensiveness of the programming. Local
affiliates decide that a program is beyond the bounds of good taste
for their communities, and they preempt the program.
It turns out that many of the affiliates’ preemptions are based on
the offensiveness of the program. There are literally hundreds of
examples of affiliates preempting on such grounds.121 Recent
examples include affiliates’ preemption of Fox’s “Temptation Island”
and “Cupid” (both deemed too racy by some affiliates), CBS’s
“Victoria’s Secret Fashion Show” (same), and ABC’s “NYPD Blue”
(which used some adult language and had brief nudity).122 In none
of these cases did any network-owned stations object or preempt. In
fact (and strikingly), there is no evidence of a network-owned station
preempting on unsuitability grounds.123 The networks could not
furnish a single example of a network-owned station preempting
because it deemed the program inappropriate for its audience.124
Even if the affiliate gained no additional revenue from its
preemption in a given situation, and thus the manifestation of
divergent incentives described in the first portion of this Part did
not apply, preemption on local unpopularity grounds might be in the
affiliate’s economic interest. There remains an incentive for the
affiliate to raise the cost of unsuitable programming so that there
will be less of it in the future.125 This means that the community will
121. See Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters and the Network Affiliated Stations Alliance, supra
note 75, at iii.
122. 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, ¶¶ 543, 544 n.1137; see also Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr. & A. Richard M. Blaiklock, Enhancing the Spectrum: Media Power,
Democracy, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 813, 871 n.386 (listing examples
of affiliates’ preemptions of network programming and adding that “[t]hese localized
programming decisions would be far less likely to exist in a regime characterized by effectively
nationalized ownership of broadcast stations”); supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
123. See Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters and the Network Affiliated Stations Alliance, supra
note 75, at 40-45.
124. This is unsurprising, of course, because such preemption will never be in the network’s
interest. If a show has sufficient popularity for it to remain on the air, the network has little
reason to care that in some markets it has a 50% audience share and in others it has a 10%
share. Network-owned stations still preempt on occasion (though 40% less often, on average,
than affiliates do), but they preempt for reasons other than offensiveness—or, more generally,
“sending a message” to the network. See 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, ¶ 544;
supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
125. It is important to distinguish this hypothetical from the one involving Show A and
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get programming better suited to its interests, which will in turn
increase the ratings for the affiliate. In other words, putting aside
the short-term benefit that affiliates may receive from preempting
(gaining revenue at the expense of the network), the affiliate might
gain a long-term benefit in the form of programming that will be
more popular in its local community and thus more remunerative
for the local station.
This might be true even if preemptions have the effect of pushing
networks toward programming that will have lower ratings
nationwide. What matters most immediately to affiliates is the local
ratings of the programs they carry, because that will be central to
their profits. This is analogous to the divergence discussed above: If
ten or twenty stations can, by preempting, push a network to switch
from a program that is popular nationally but unpopular in their
communities to one that is less popular nationally but popular in
their communities, they will accrue most of the gains from that
switch but share the costs with the entire network.126
Even in situations where preemption might cost the preempting
affiliates more than they gain,127 the affiliate might have nonShow B above. See supra p. 467. The point I noted above was that if an affiliate ordinarily
received X% of the advertising time in a given network show, it would be in the station’s
immediate economic interest to preempt that show even if it was able to keep only X% of the
advertising in the substitute show, if the substitute was more popular in the viewing
community than the network program. The more popular program would produce higher
advertising revenues when it aired, so the amount of revenue yielded by X% would be higher
for that show.
My point here, by contrast, is that even if a particular preemption decision yielded the same
revenue for the affiliate in that time slot as the network program would have yielded, the local
station would have an interest in preempting because of a longer-term strategy of influencing
the network to provide programming in the future that would be more popular. The
immediate revenue would be the same, but the long-term benefits for the affiliate might be
greater with preemption than without.
It is important to note that this happens. When an affiliate preempts programming it
deems unsuitable and substitutes a show that has long been in reruns—as has sometimes
occurred, see Nat’l Affiliated Stations Alliance, Petition for Inquiry Into Network Practices
25 (Mar. 8, 2001) (noting substitution of reruns of “The Andy Griffith Show” for programming
deemed unsuitable)—the affiliate has no illusions that the substitute program will have high
ratings. The affiliate does not pursue additional revenue through the substitution so much
as it pursues gains in the future flowing from the impact of its preemption decision.
126. See Schwartz & Vincent, supra note 66, at 4 n.9.
127. This would occur if, for example, the network’s profits decrease so significantly that
its programming becomes much weaker, and less popular, both nationally and in the local
station’s viewing area.
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economic reasons for preempting. Affiliates might value noneconomic benefits such as: the influence on the local community,
and the community’s values, that the power to preempt confers; the
gratitude of the local citizenry; and/or the power to influence
network bigwigs.
Vetoing a program via preemption is the main form of influence
that stations can exercise over network programming (short of
ending their relationship with the network). Affiliates have a hard
time, for example, playing the affirmative role of guaranteeing the
success of a program. If stations covering 80% of television households were to voice their support for a given program, a network
would not likely be moved unless it had reason to believe that the
remaining 20% would be interested as well. Without national
coverage (or something very close to it), national advertisers will
look elsewhere. But if stations covering 15 or 20% of households
expressed their unwillingness to carry a given program, that would
be sufficient to doom almost any program.128 A small group of
stations, in other words, has the power to veto a given program, but
not to give the green light to one.129
Note also that affiliates are disproportionately likely to be in
small- or medium-sized cities. The stations that networks have
purchased are heavily concentrated in the biggest cities, leaving
affiliates more heavily concentrated in smaller markets.130 This
highlights the role that preemption can play: stations in smaller
communities know that the only way they can influence network
behavior is if they and other small-market stations band together to
block programming they consider offensive.
2. How Does Raising the Cap Affect Preemptions?

128. See Les Brown, Self-Regulation in American Television in Areas Aside from Program
Content, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 705, 713 (1995) (noting that “[l]ocal broadcasters were
implicitly encouraged to preempt network programming they deemed unsuitable for their
audiences” and that “[t]hese restrictions gave the stations a small but not insignificant voice
in network programming, since substantial rejection by the affiliates could doom a new
series”).
129. See id.
130. See Top 25, supra note 23.
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The discussion above indicates why preemptions might occur, but
it does not explain why raising the cap has any impact on them. It
is not intuitively obvious why there would be an impact. Indeed, the
networks argued that, although preemption was the only thing that
the ownership caps could conceivably affect, in reality the ownership
caps would not have any significant effect on preemptions. The
networks’ contention was that the number of stations owned by a
network does not affect the behavior of a given local
affiliate—regarding preemption or anything else.131 In light of the
points I made in the previous section, a reader might be tempted to
agree: since local stations are just local, why should they care
whether the network with which they are affiliated owns one of the
network affiliates or 100? Why does that affect the local affiliate’s
position in its home market, and therefore the value to it of
remaining affiliated with that network? After all, the fundamental
choice for any affiliate is whether to remain affiliated with the
network or to separate from that network (by either becoming an
independent or affiliating with another network). Similarly, the
choice for a network is whether to remain affiliated with that
station or to abandon the relationship (and either forego an affiliate
in that community or choose another station). How does the number
of stations owned by the network change the affiliate’s or the
network’s reservation price? However many stations the network
owns nationwide, the affiliate is still its only entrant in that market,
and the network is no more or less attractive to the affiliate if it
owns more stations. The negotiations would be affected by the
presence of other non-network local stations (as they would give the
network alternatives in that market) and by the presence of other
national networks (as they would give the local station alternatives
with which to affiliate), but it is not clear why the network’s
ownership of stations in other cities would affect the negotiations.
The short answer to this question is that the number of local
stations owned by the network indeed has little effect on the basic
economic relationship between affiliates and the networks. Notably,
the FCC found that “the largest network station owners possess no
greater bargaining power—as measured by prime time preemp131. See Fox Entertainment Group, Inc. et al., supra note 50, at 39-40; see also Owen et al.,
supra note 106, at 1-2.

2004]

NATIONAL TELEVISION OWNERSHIP CAP

473

tions—than the smallest network station owner.”132 Perhaps more
strikingly, the affiliates’ study discussed at some length its conclusion that a low national ownership cap does not appear to increase
affiliates’ bargaining power or profits. As the study stated,
The [national ownership] Cap does not appear to systematically
strengthen the bargaining power of individual affiliates in
negotiations with their network—for renewal of the affiliation
or, absent a binding cap, for sale of the station to the network—and, hence, does not appear to increase the profit that
affiliates can attain.133

The longer answer to the question is that raising the national
ownership cap reduces the likelihood and effectiveness of preemption without affecting the bargaining power, or the bargains struck,
by either side. The reduction in the likelihood of preemption is fairly
straightforward: each additional station that a network can buy is
one more station that the network can control. To put the point
differently, purchasing a station lets a network overcome the
divergence described above so that it can maximize joint profit.134 As
132. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,932, 13,941 (2003).
133. Schwartz & Vincent, supra note 66, at 4; see also id. at 9-11 (discussing this
proposition at length in a section of the study entitled “The Cap Has No Obvious Impact on
Affiliates’ Profits”). The study elaborated in the remainder of the paragraph quoted in text:
Briefly, the logic is as follows. The economic theory of bargaining predicts that,
when an affiliate bargains with its network, the profits that will be attained by
the two parties will depend on (a) their strategic power, (b) the total profit that
results if agreement is reached, and (c) the profit each party could earn if there
is no agreement—their “outside options.” The Cap is likely to affect items (b) and
(c). Regarding (c), the network’s outside option if negotiations fail with its
preferred station, A, is to reach an affiliation agreement with another local
station, B, or (absent the Cap) to integrate with B. By denying the possibility of
integration, the Cap reduces the value of the network’s outside option when
negotiating with A, an effect that favors station A in the bargaining. However,
the Cap also reduces (relative to no Cap) item (b), the joint profit available to be
shared between the preferred station A and the network, because they too are
precluded from integration. This effect works to the station’s detriment, and is
more likely than not to outweigh the first effect. Thus, the profit that an initial
affiliate could collect by selling the station to its network absent a binding cap
is likely to exceed the profit the affiliate could earn by remaining an affiliated
station under a binding cap.
Id. at 4.
134. See id. at 4 (noting that joint ownership “would allow the network and its affiliates to
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the affiliates’ study noted, “[i]mportantly, a move toward such jointprofit maximization would reduce the number of rejections in each
market and, because all stations would now air a larger portion of
the network’s schedule, would increase the degree of uniformity in
programming decisions across markets.”135 Strikingly, the networks
emphasized both the costs that preemptions created for them and
the fact that joint maximization of revenue would lead to fewer
preemptions, but nonetheless sought to downplay the obvious
conclusion that greater network ownership would likely yield fewer
preemptions.136 The facts, however, follow the logic: clear data
(which no one disputed) showed that affiliates preempt 40% more
often than network-owned stations do.137 So one effect of raising the
cap is fairly straightforward—the stations that are bought by the
networks will preempt less often, and thus the total number of
preemptions will decrease.138
make decisions—including about what gets shown when—that maximize their combined
profit”).
135. Id. at 8.
136. See Fox Entm’t Group, Inc. et al., supra note 50, at 38-40, 39 n.132.
137. See 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, ¶ 544.
138. The affiliates suggested that broadcast networks allow fewer preemptions than they
did in the past, and that networks that own more of their stations allow fewer preemptions
than other networks do. On this basis they posited that increasing the national ownership
caps will lead to less preemption among affiliates. See Schwartz & Vincent, supra note 50, at
4. This is different from the arguments previously discussed—namely that network purchases
of additional stations, first, will likely lead those particular stations to preempt less often
(because network-owned stations preempt less frequently), and, second, will leave fewer
affiliates who might preempt and thus will make their preemptions less effective in
influencing the network (because it is less likely that there will be a sufficient number of
affiliates preempting to veto a program). The affiliates intimate that the lower number of
preemptions in recent years suggests that bigger networks will be able to bully their affiliates
into preempting less.
There are two problems with this argument. First, the data on this are conflicting and, as
the FCC noted, unclear. See 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, ¶ 560. There is little
evidence bearing on this issue—some of it supports the affiliates’ position and some of it does
not. See id.
Second, the affiliates’ reasoning is in considerable tension with their own economic study.
Recall that the study indicated that the cap does not strengthen local affiliates’ bargaining
position. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. If that is so, why does its retention help
affiliates keep their preemption power? Schwartz and Vincent persuasively argue, and the
networks agree, that the negotiations between the parties will be guided by the value that
each receives from the relationship and the availability of other possible partners—another
network (for affiliates) or another local station (for networks). See supra notes 131-33 and
accompanying text. A change in the ownership cap does not change those negotiating
benchmarks in any appreciable way.
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Why, though, does this have any impact on the affiliates who are
not bought by the network? A network’s purchase of station A has
no direct effect on station B, and a reduction in preemptions by
station A has no direct effect on station B. The answer is that it has
an effect on station B insofar as that station hopes to use preemption to influence network programming.
There may be some network programs so marginal that preemption by a single affiliate will be enough to force the network to
change course, either by changing the show or cancelling it. There
may be other network programs so popular in some regions of the
country that preemption by many stations will not affect network
behavior. But many shows will fall into the middle ground
—sufficiently popular to withstand one affiliate’s preemption, but
not sufficiently popular to withstand preemptions by multiple
affiliates.139
Note finally, that even if preemptions have decreased—and have decreased more for
networks that own more stations—it is not clear what conclusion we should draw. There is
reason to believe that these two phenomena simply tell us that some networks are willing to
devote more of their resources to reducing preemptions because of the disproportionate costs
that preemptions create for networks. Put somewhat differently, a network would be willing
to sacrifice other sources of value for the sake of limiting preemption for the same reason that
it would be interested in buying more local stations—as a way of reducing the costs of
preemption. See 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, ¶ 514.
139. See Fox Entm’t Group, Inc. et al., supra note 50, at 39-40; see also 2003 FCC
Ownership Order, supra note 1, ¶ 543 (noting situations in which preemptions by multiple
affiliates have led networks to alter shows); FCC, Network Inquiry Special Staff, An Analysis
of the Network Affiliate Relationship in Television (1980); Owen et al., supra note 106.
There is some reason to believe—and the networks do believe—that almost all shows will
fall into this last category, because the diminution in national advertising revenue will not
be linear. As noted in the previous section, preemptions reduce network revenue by making
the preempted program less attractive to national advertisers because fewer viewers will see
it. The problem of preemption may extend further. Part of the value of national networks for
advertisers is precisely that their coverage is national. National advertisers place a premium
on (and pay a premium for) advertisements that offer one-stop shopping for a national
audience—and national television networks offer the best opportunity for it. See Schwartz &
Vincent, supra note 66, at 7 n.20.
[T]he fact that broadcast network advertising is the most efficient way to target
virtually 100 percent of television homes gives it a unique value to advertisers.
To the extent that advertisers are unable to cover nearly all television homes
with a single network buy, the attractiveness of broadcast networks as a vehicle
for national advertising will be diminished and prices will erode.
Id. (quoting a 2001 Viacom statement). Networks believe that they can lose a small portion
of their viewers (e.g., an affiliate that reaches one percent of households) without eliminating
this premium, but that once a few stations preempt, the percentage reduction in advertising
revenue will be greater than the percentage reduction in coverage. Advertisers will no longer
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For this last category of programs, station B’s preemption alone
will not lead the network to act differently. If, though, other stations
joined station B in preempting, their collaboration could have an
impact. In many cases, then, for an affiliate to be able to influence
network programming, it will need to have like-minded sister
stations in other markets. And, importantly, the more local stations
the networks control, the smaller the pool of stations that might
buck the network. A network’s movement from owning stations
reaching 35% of television households to 45% does not prevent some
combination of the remaining affiliates from preempting programs
in a way that influences the network. But the move from 35% to
45% does make such effective preemptions less likely, simply
because it will be harder for a critical mass of affiliates to form;
there will be fewer affiliates who might send this message.
So, merely by purchasing station A, the network mitigates station
B’s ability to influence network programming. The network does not
have to expend resources negotiating with station B to reach this
result; it comes with the purchase of station A.
Note that in some situations the network still might have an
interest in limiting station B’s preemptions directly (so that it can
further reduce preemptions), but in some situations it might not.
That is, holding aside the barrier to control posed by the Time
Optioning and Right to Reject rules,140 and holding aside the value
that the network would have to sacrifice in order to obtain that
control (it will have to give up something else in its negotiations),
there might be circumstances under which its control of station A
(and others like it) would leave it unconcerned about the preemption
decisions of an individual affiliate. As I mentioned above, in many
situations a single preemption will have little impact on the
network. If, with respect to a given program or slate of programs the
network knows that virtually all of its affiliates will not preempt,
the prospect of preemption by one affiliate in a medium-sized
market, or a couple of affiliates in small markets, might be of fairly
little consequence to the network.141 This could be good news for the
pay a premium for the program’s advertising, so the advertising revenue will drop more
steeply than the viewership does. See id.
140. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
141. See Fox Entm’t Group, Inc. et al., supra note 50, at 39-40; see also Owen et al., supra
note 106. Recall that affiliates are more likely to be in smaller markets. See supra note 130
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affiliate that wants to be able to preempt for its own revenue
enhancement: if the affiliate wants to make more money by
broadcasting other programming, the network might let it do so
when the network knows that such preemption would apply to only
one or two small stations. Rendering preemption unimportant to the
network’s bottom line, however, also means that the local station
has lost a potential lever for influencing the network—in fact, the
only lever the local station has (short of ending its affiliate relationship). The hypothetical affiliate might be able to preempt to its
heart’s content, but that preemption would have no real effect on
network programming. And the prospect of losing that lever—really
a collective veto—is disturbing to many affiliates.142
In any event, the bottom line is that raising the ownership caps
results in, first, fewer stations that are inclined to preempt at all
(because they are now owned by the network) and, second, the
diminished likelihood of affiliates successfully influencing the
network to change course (by preempting a given program in large
enough numbers to make the program unprofitable). Accordingly,
a lower national ownership cap tends to protect affiliates’ ability to
veto programming. The bigger networks become, the less they have
to listen to their affiliates.
In light of the way those preemptions are used (i.e., that affiliates
often seek to veto programming they deem offensive), a lower cap
should please those who distrust the values of network executives.143
Cultural conservatives have good reason to like a lower cap, and its
attendant potential for more frequent and effective preemptions,
because the affiliates’ decisions will often be to preempt programming that they deem offensive.144 No local station has ever preand accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Pappas Telecasting Cos., Comments Before the FCC 11-12 (Jan. 2, 2003)
(arguing that if a local affiliate preempts the network because, “in its judgment [the network
programming] does not conform with the local standards of decency or is not of local
importance, ... the network could purchase another station in the market, and unilaterally
cancel the network affiliation agreement”), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.
gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513401727; Hank Price,
Statement Before the FCC 5 (Mar. 31, 2003) (“If you raise the cap, the networks will simply
use their leverage to buy more stations, take away more control from local communities and
centralize control of the nation’s terrestrial broadcast system.”), available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id _document=6514085275.
143. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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empted a program because it was too banal. This usually translates
into culturally “liberal” programming being preempted.145 More
generally, this ensures that national networks will not just be
programmed in their headquarters and then beamed to the rest of
the country, as cable networks are.
C. The Costs of Preemption (and Therefore the Benefits of Raising
the National Ownership Cap)
The discussion so far has focused on the potential dangers of
raising the television station ownership limit, and has found
one—in the form of reducing preemptions and depriving affiliates
of the ability to effectively veto network programs. But what is on
the other side? Why do the networks want so badly to have the
ownership limit set higher?
The discussion above provides much of the answer to this
question: having a network program that is aired by all the network’s affiliates is valuable to advertisers and therefore valuable to
networks. Insofar as the networks can reduce the chances of their
programming being preempted, they can maximize their advertising
revenue.146 Raising the national ownership cap is important in this
regard, because the higher the ownership cap the more stations a
network can control—ensuring a lower preemption rate. Obviously,
the networks would like no cap whatsoever (and have lobbied for
that), but from their perspective an increase in the cap is better
than no movement at all.
Part of the problem with preemption for the networks involves
uncertainty. If a network knew that a given station would not air
any of its programs on, say, weeknights, then it could charge
national advertisers less money (because they were not being aired
145. For example, the Parents Television Council, an organization devoted to bringing back
“positive, family-oriented television programming,” Parents Television Council, About US,
available at http://www.parentstv.org/PTC/aboutus/main.asp (last visited Sept. 5, 2004), sent
letters to CBS affiliates urging them to preempt the Victoria’s Secret Fashion Show. See Press
Release, Parents Television Council, PTC Urges CBS Affiliates to Preempt Victoria’s Secret
Fashion Show: PTC President Brent Bozell Says Show Crosses Decency Line (Nov. 18, 2003),
available at http://www.parentstv.org/PTC/publications/release/2003/1118.asp. The Council’s
president wrote, “[w]hen will CBS learn that this broadcast is altogether a sleazy exhibition
that is best relegated to the local strip joint, and not a network television broadcast?” Id.
146. See 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, ¶ 514.
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in that community) or seek to affiliate with a station that would run
their programming. Preemption, though, is not so predictable. As a
result, networks sometimes lose money when unexpected preemptions occur.
A second problem with preemption exists even if there is total
certainty about which nights an affiliate will preempt: the network’s
costs of production do not decrease when a station preempts a
program, but the revenue does decrease (because the advertiser
gains the attention of fewer viewers).
The study commissioned by the affiliates aptly summarizes the
costs of affiliates’ preemptions:
[I]ndependent programming decisions by affiliates come at a
cost. The network’s shows will fail to secure nationwide coverage, thereby reducing the total profits that potentially could be
shared by the network and the affiliates relative to what could
be achieved if each station aired every show. In making its
individual profit calculation when rejecting a network’s show, a
station does not take into account the full harm that such
rejection causes to the effectiveness of network advertising, and
hence to the network’s revenue and incentives to invest in
programming.147

The local affiliates concede that they may preempt programs in
ways that harm the network but that benefit individual stations
solely because of the fact that the harms are widely shared and the
benefits are concentrated on the particular affiliate. In this way,
affiliates’ independence imposes costs that diminish the network’s
revenue and incentives to invest. As the affiliates’ study noted, “the
[national ownership] Cap is likely to reduce the total profit of
networks and stations and may well reduce network investments in
programming.”148
The affiliates note that this is part of a trade-off—networks have
lower profits, but at the same time there is a greater likelihood of
local stations blocking programming that the community does not
want. But the important point for purposes of this section is that the
costs exist.
147. Schwartz & Vincent, supra note 66, at 8.
148. Id. at 4.
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The costs of preemption are particularly great for networks given
the available alternatives. For most viewers, broadcast stations are
just another option on the cable or satellite lineups, and cable
stations are steadily gaining market share.149 These two facts
combine to make cable and satellite networks more viable competitors with broadcast networks. And one big difference is that cable
and satellite networks do not have to worry about preemption
decisions made by local stations, because they are not carried by
local stations. Once they are carried by a cable operator, they know
that their signal will reach viewers.
Broadcast networks argue that raising the national ownership
cap, by making preemptions less effective, puts them closer to a
level playing field with cable operators. Both will be programmed by
the network and either accepted or rejected in toto by a local station
(in the case of a broadcast network) or a local cable operator (in the
case of a cable network).150
Moreover, there is good reason to believe that, absent a higher
ownership cap, broadcast networks will continue to lose ground to
cable and satellite networks. Not only will higher caps help
broadcast networks’ profits, but those profits will help to prevent a
further loss of programming, and viewers, to cable and satellite
networks. As the FCC noted in its ownership order, “the economies
of scale and scope made possible by network expansion of station
ownership will contribute to the preservation of over-the-air

149. See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text; infra notes 214-15 and accompanying
text.
150. Schwartz and Vincent put forward one way of understanding the value to the
networks of a stable national schedule:
The provision of a schedule of programs allows networks to internalize an
externality known as “audience flow”—the tendency of audiences to remain
watching the same channel across shows. It also creates an incentive for the
network to engage in “branding” activities that may help differentiate it from
other programmers. As for bundling across regions, some programs such as
many sports events, awards shows and perhaps even some entertainment shows
obviously receive their maximum audience through simultaneous exhibition.
Simultaneous broadcasting may also be a response to the desire of national
advertisers for a predictable audience demographic and a particular time of
viewership. Whatever the reason, the networks stress that their ability to
ensure simultaneous airing of the great majority of their programs in various
markets is very important.
Schwartz & Vincent, supra note 66, at 7 (footnotes omitted).

2004]

NATIONAL TELEVISION OWNERSHIP CAP

481

television by deterring the migration of expensive programming,
such as sports programming, to cable networks.”151
The networks’ bottom-line argument is that overcoming the
danger of preemptions is necessary to their long-term viability. They
know that their audience is shrinking, and that it is becoming
increasingly difficult for them to compete with cable networks (not
to mention other forms of communication, like the Internet). They
believe that they need to increase their long-term profitability, and
that the most effective way to achieve this is by being able to “clear”
their programs nationally—that is, by avoiding local preemption
and thus being able to guarantee advertisers a national audience.
This, in their view, will help enable them to continue to gain the
revenue necessary to compete with cable networks and provide an
attractive product.152
III. EVALUATING THE RULES: ADVANTAGES OF HASTENING THE
DEMISE OF BROADCASTING
The discussion so far might seem to lead to a fairly straightforward analysis: an increase in the national ownership cap will have
one effect that is bad or good depending on your degree of cultural
conservatism (reducing the ability of affiliates to veto programming), and a second, related effect that is more obviously good
(enhancing the viability of broadcasting). In my view, the first half
of that analysis is correct, and the second half has it backwards:
enhancing the viability of broadcasting is a bug, not a feature.
The share of the television market captured by broadcast
television has been steadily decreasing for decades. In the 1970s,
over 90% of viewers watched one of the then-three major broadcast
television networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC).153 Since that time, cable
and satellite television have changed the television landscape
dramatically. The broadcast networks’ share of television viewers

151. 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, ¶ 583.
152. If raising the national ownership cap helps broadcast networks stay viable, why don’t
local broadcasters see this benefit and support raising the cap? The answer to this question
is that local stations have different interests than networks do. See supra Part II.B.
153. Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY
L.J. 1579, 1693 (2003).
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has steadily declined as the cable channels’ share has increased.154
In fact, cable channels now have a majority of the audience share:
the now-seven broadcast networks combined garner less than a 50%
share of hours viewed.155 This does not mean that broadcasters’
ratings are similar to those for cable and satellite networks. The
ratings for the four most popular broadcast networks (ABC, CBS,
Fox, and NBC) still exceed the ratings for the most popular cable
networks.156 But the gap between the big broadcasters and the big
cable networks decreases every year. (For instance, the 2003 season
finale of The Sopranos was the highest rated program that evening,
even though less than 30% of households subscribe to HBO.)157
Even as the broadcast networks’ percentage of the television
market is declining, the whole notion of a separate “television
market” is becoming less tenable. Consumer substitution among
media is increasing.158 More and more, consumers find that they can
get the same sorts of communications from a variety of sources.
Indeed, one of the studies commissioned by the FCC found just such
154. See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery
of Video Programming, 19 F.C.C.R. 1606, ¶ 94 (2004).
[I]n the 1993-1994 television season, broadcast television stations accounted for
a 71 share of all-day viewing. By the 1997-1998 season, the broadcast stations’
share dropped to 58. This trend continues, with broadcast stations achieving a
45 share of all-day viewing during the 2002-2003 season, down from a 47 share
the previous season.
Id.; see also id. ¶ 26 (noting numbers for cable networks that are the mirror image of those
above (i.e., rising from a 29 share to a 55 share during the same time period)).
155. See id. ¶ 94. The seven broadcast networks are ABC, CBS, Fox, NBC, UPN, WB, and
PaxTV. See id. ¶ 93.
156. See id. ¶ 26 n.69 (“For the 2002-2003 TV season, Nielsen Media Research reports that
the top-rated cable network for all-day audience was Nickelodeon/Nick-At-Nite with a 4 share
compared to a 7 share for Fox affiliates, the lowest rated of the four major networks during
the 2002-2003 TV season.”).
157. See 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, ¶ 124; see also Annual Assessment of
the Status of Competition in the Market for Delivery of Video Programming, 19 F.C.C.R. at
¶ 26 n.69 (“Although broadcast networks ratings tend to be large compared with any single
cable channel, it is getting more common for a cable show to garner audiences similar to
broadcast network shows.”).
The disparity between the audience share of an average program on one of the big four
broadcast networks and the audience share of an average cable network is even greater than
the disparity between the top broadcast and cable programs. This just highlights another
difference between cable and broadcast programming—namely, that some cable networks aim
at niche markets. See, e.g., id. at app. C, tbl. C-1 & C-2 (offering examples of current niche
market stations, such as The Weather Channel and AMC).
158. See 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, ¶¶ 126-28.
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a phenomenon, and in particular that “there is clearest evidence of
substitution between Internet and broadcast TV, both overall and
for news.”159 So broadcast television is declining in importance in its
own market as that market declines in importance and coherence.
In light of the above, we might wonder whether broadcast
television will soon become irrelevant and die on its own no matter
what happens, so that there is no reason to worry about ownership
limits. This argument ignores two distinguishing features of
broadcasting, however. First, television broadcasting occupies
hundreds of megahertz of valuable spectrum—and that spectrum
cannot be used for other purposes.160 The licenses for that chunk of
spectrum are limited to broadcasting. So even if a local television
station wanted to move exclusively to cable television and sell its
spectrum to a higher valued use (e.g., wireless telephony), it would
not do so.161 It could not take the latter step, and therefore would
have no reason to take the former one.
This restriction on alternative uses is a matter of law, not physics.
Congress could enact legislation permitting other uses of the
spectrum currently devoted to television broadcasting. But we have
reason to expect that Congress will resist such a move even if it is
in the public interest, because of the second distinguishing feature
of broadcasting: there is a principal/agent problem. Government
officials (and in particular members of Congress) have reasons to
want to preserve broadcast television that have nothing to do with
what their constituents want.162 The lifeblood for elected officials—and one of the biggest advantages of incumbency—is free
advertising, for example coverage of an official’s visits to local

159. Joel Waldfogel, Consumer Substitution Among Media 3, available at http://hraunfoss.
fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226838A8.doc (last visited Sept. 5, 2004).
160. See Gerald R. Faulhaber & David Farber, Spectrum Management: Property Rights,
Markets, and the Commons 4, reported in Gerald R. Faulhaber & David Farber, Comments
Before the FCC (July 18, 2002), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/
ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513282647 (stating that the FCC has not
allowed other uses of the broadcast spectrum); Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity:
Idle Spectrum as a First Amendment Violation, 52 DUKE L.J. 1, 18 (2002) (stating same).
161. Benjamin, supra note 160, at 18.
162. See Charles Platt, The Great HDTV Swindle, WIRED, Feb. 1997, at 57 (“So long as
broadcasting is protected from the free market by legislators who depend on TV to get
themselves reelected, Congress will continue giving broadcasters special treatment and
favors, and consumers will suffer.”).
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community events.163 The easiest and most effective way for
members of Congress to reach their constituents without having to
pay for advertising is to appear at a community event that is
covered by the local television station. Constituents have little
reason to value this coverage, but politicians do.164 Because the
interests of government representatives and their constituents are
not aligned in this respect, we have reason to expect that government actors will aim to protect broadcast television beyond what
their constituents would want.165
Indeed, the history of broadcast regulation is characterized by
coziness between government actors and incumbent broadcasters.166
This has led to government policies that have created barriers to
entry for potential competitors and given valuable goodies to
broadcasters.167
The FCC’s response to cable television is a case in point. The
Commission put explicit limits on the growth of cable television, as
well as implicit ones.168 Examples of the latter include: tight
restrictions on cable operators’ ability to import signals from other
163. See Mark Tushnet et al., Judicial Review and Congressional Tenure: An Observation,
66 TEX. L. REV. 967, 973 (1988) (stating that incumbents are generally better known than
challengers because of free advertising, including local television coverage of the incumbent).
164. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. Chief Talks of Frustration and Surprise, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 2003, at C2 (noting that local broadcasters “have considerable influence because they
are in every Congressional district and control most of the television and radio outlets that
are vital to political life”).
165. Polling regarding the national ownership cap supports this point. See Matthew Rose,
TV Networks Join Forces to Fight Backlash over Station Ownership, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2,
2003, at A1 (noting a survey showing “that only 11% [of respondents] believe network
ownership of their local station is a bad thing and 68% think the market should decide
whether that should happen or not” and quoting a pollster as saying “I have never seen a
situation where politicians have a greater disconnect from the people they represent”).
166. See THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST
PROGRAMMING (1994).
167. See Pablo T. Spiller & Carlo Cardilli, Towards a Property Rights Approach to
Communications Spectrum, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 53, 62-63 (1999) (suggesting that “regulators’
real interest in perpetuating the existing spectrum administration stems from their desire to
maintain the steady flow of political rents generated by control over spectrum”).
168. See Stanley M. Besen & Robert W. Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television, 44
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 81-91 (1981) (noting FCC actions that limited growth of cable in
an attempt to protect local broadcast stations); see also Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, To
Adopt Rules and Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorizations in the Business Radio
Service for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Community Antenna Systems,
2 F.C.C.2d 725, ¶¶ 123-30 (1966) (placing limits on the growth of cable, in light of concerns
about local UHF broadcasters) [hereinafter Amendment of Subpart L].
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markets;169 rules ensuring that broadcasters alone could show
certain movies and sports events;170 and a requirement that cable
operators carry all local broadcast stations.171 Broadcasters sought
all of these rules, and the FCC—motivated by a desire to protect
broadcasting from the competition that cable represented—imposed
them.172 As the FCC Chairman frankly noted in 1971, the FCC had
interpreted its public interest mandate to include “protectionism for
over-the-air broadcasting.”173
A more recent example of policy makers’ favors for broadcasters
involves digital television. Beginning in the 1980s, broadcasters
lobbied vigorously for the FCC to devote unused broadcast spectrum
to high-definition television, which the broadcasters said would be
a great boon to consumers.174 The FCC decided that a conversion to
169. See Amendment of Subpart K, Part 74, of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations
Relative to Community Antenna Television System and Inquiry into the Development of
Communications Technology and Services to Formulate Regulatory Policy and Rulemaking
and/or Legislative Proposals, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, ¶ 66 (1972); Amendment of Subpart L, supra
note 168, ¶¶ 141, 155; Amendment of Subpart L, Part 11, To Adopt Rules & Regulations to
Govern the Grant of Authorizations in the Business Radio Service for Microwave Stations to
Relay Television Signals to Community Antenna Systems, 38 F.C.C. 683, ¶¶ 44-48 (1965).
170. See Amendment of Subpart K, Part 74, of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations
Relative to Community Antenna Television System and Inquiry Into the Development of
Communications Technology and Services To Formulate Regulatory Policy and Rulemaking
and/or Legislative Proposals, 23 F.C.C.2d 825, app. A (1970). Commentators have argued the
rules “were designed to protect broadcasting from the perceived threat presented by early
cable television but ended up stifling cable’s development for no good reason.” Jonathan
Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1196 (1993). In 1977, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the rules as outside the FCC’s authority. Home Box
Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 29-31 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
171. See 47 U.S.C. § 534(a) (2000) (“Each cable operator shall carry, on the cable system
of that operator, the signals of local commercial television stations and qualified low power
stations as provided by this section.”); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180,
185 (1997) (upholding legislation under intermediate scrutiny because the record supported
“Congress’ predictive judgment that the must-carry provisions further important
governmental interests”).
172. See Amendment of Part C, Part 91, To Adopt Rules and Regulations to Govern the
Grant of Authorizations in the Business Radio Service for Microwave Stations to Relay
Television Signals to Community Antenna Systems, 2 F.C.C. 2d 725, ¶¶ 25-26 (1966); see also
Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and the Administrative Process in Japan and the United
States, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 615, 700 (1991) (concluding that in the early regulation of cable, the
FCC “sought to preserve the market position of the over-the-air broadcasters, its long-term
clients”).
173. Cable Antenna Television (CATV): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Communications
& Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong. 34 (1971).
174. See JOEL BRINKLEY, DEFINING VISION: THE BATTLE FOR THE FUTURE OF TELEVISION
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high-definition television was in consumers’ interest, but (interestingly, and in accordance with broadcasters’ wishes) that highdefinition television would not be sufficiently remunerative unless
the government gave additional spectrum to broadcasters.175 So the
FCC gave additional spectrum to each broadcaster for purposes of
broadcasting in high-definition television, doubling the amount of
spectrum devoted to each broadcaster during the lengthy—and
indefinite—“transition” period during which consumers would be
expected to buy new television sets or converter boxes.176 Meanwhile, the mission changed. The main players agreed on a standard
that was digital, and the FCC later decided not to require that they
transmit in high definition.177 This means that each broadcaster
now occupies two six-megahertz swaths of spectrum, and each
broadcaster is permitted to transmit digitally with the same picture
quality as its current analog signal.178
What is particularly striking is that other countries have moved
toward digital television not through digital broadcasting but

3-27 (1997) (chronicling the interplay between the development and promotion of HDTV and
broadcasters’ efforts to retain their spectrum).
175. See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing Television
Broadcast Service, 7 F.C.C.R. 6924, ¶ 2 (1992).
176. Broadcasters are supposed to return one of their two spectrum allotments by the end
of 2006 and stop transmitting in NTSC (the current, analog mode), but only if at least 85%
of households can receive a digital signal via broadcast. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(14)(B) (2000).
As members of Congress have noted, no one believes that NTSC broadcasting will stop by the
end of 2006—so, of course, no one expects the spectrum allotments to be returned by then. See
BENJAMIN, supra note 107, at 144-46 (Supp. 2004); Jenna Greene, Digital TV a Remote
Possibility, LEGAL TIMES, July 30, 2001, at 1 (quoting representative Ed Markey as saying,
“[t]here’s no longer a soul in the industry who thinks the transition will be over by 2006”);
J.H. Snider & Michael Calabrese, Speeding the DTV Transition: A Consumer Tax Credit Can
Unplug Analog TV, Reduce the Deficit and Redeploy Low-Frequency Spectrum for Wireless
Broadband 4 (New Am. Found., May 2004) (noting that “many savvy insiders believe that the
broadcast DTV transition, as defined under current law, won’t be complete until 2025 at the
earliest”), available at http://www.newamerica.net/Download_Docs/pdfs/Pub_File_ 1575
_1.pdf.
177. See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing Television
Broadcast Service, 11 F.C.C.R. 17,771 (1996); Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish
Children: Autonomy, Information and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 98-101 (2001).
178. See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing Television
Broadcast Service, 7 F.C.C.R. 3340 (1992); BENJAMIN, supra note 107, at 359-60 (“Overall, a
system that once started out as 6 megahertz for HDTV (either digital or analog) has become
6 megahertz for a number of services, one of which will be DTV [digital television]—but
perhaps not ‘high definition’ television at all.”).
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instead through digital cable and satellite.179 And in the United
States, cable and satellite have transitioned to digital signals on
their own, without any government subsidies.180 That is, millions of
American households already receive digital signals—from cable or
satellite. Sales of digital televisions have been disappointing thus
far, but those that have been purchased are overwhelmingly
receiving their signals from cable and satellite providers. So a huge
amount of otherwise available spectrum is set aside for the broadcasting of digital signals, even though only slightly more than
500,000 households actually watch digital signals from broadcasters.181
But focusing on specific, and relatively recent, decisions like these
overlooks the more fundamental ways in which government actors
shaped broadcast to meet their own goals and desires, and broadcasters influenced government officials for their own benefit.
Government decisions helped to ensure that broadcasters would
have great influence over viewers but would remain beholden to
government officials. For instance, Congress and the FCC designed
the broadcast network to protect incumbents and to create a few big
television networks. Early regulations favored the existing players
over new entrants (and denied licenses to many upstarts).182 This
179. See BENJAMIN, supra note 107, at 344-46.
Interestingly, in 2003 Berlin had a rapid transition to digital broadcasting. Berliners who
relied on analog over-the-air broadcasting had to choose among foregoing television service,
buying a new television, buying a digital-to-analog converter box, or signing up for cable or
satellite service. The German government subsidized the purchase of converter boxes for lowincome individuals. The entire process went remarkably smoothly, and Berlin was able to
open up the formerly analog airwaves to more services with minimal disruption and little
expense (approximately $500,000 to buy the 6,000 converter boxes for low-income individuals).
See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GERMAN DTV TRANSITION DIFFERS FROM U.S.
TRANSITION IN MANY RESPECTS, BUT CERTAIN KEY CHALLENGES ARE SIMILAR (2004), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04926t.pdf; Snider & Calabrese, supra note 176; Thomas
Hazlett, Finally, Something Good on German TV: Berlin Has Digital Television. Why Can't
the U.S. Follow?, SLATE (Oct. 7, 2003), at http://www. slate.com/id/2089424.
180. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ADDITIONAL FEDERAL
EFFORTS COULD HELP ADVANCE DIGITAL TELEVISION TRANSITION 7 (2002) (“Like broadcasters,
cable television systems are also transitioning to digital, although they are under no
government mandate to do so.”); Hazlett, supra note 179; Snider & Calabrese, supra note 176,
at 2 (noting that “a DTV transition is happening—but it is occurring almost entirely via
satellite and cable subscription services”).
181. See Allison Romano & Ken Kerschbaumer, Brighter, Clearer, Wider, BROADCASTING
& CABLE, Jan. 25, 2004, at 14.
182. See generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST
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reflected an alliance between government actors and the major
incumbents. The latter received protection from competition, and
the former got a few broadcasters in their communities who would
have large market shares.183 The government also created a strong
renewal presumption, which meant that incumbents had little
reason to fear losing their licenses to competitors.184 At the same
time, government policy emphasized localism—each community
having three or four television stations of its own.185 That policy
ensured that there would be only three or four national broadcast
networks.186 So we got a few big networks, and few channels in each
city.187
Having a few incumbents beholden to government actors for their
licenses both enabled and created an incentive for significant
government control. The paucity of channels in each city made the
networks a tempting (irresistible?) political target. Unsurprisingly,
government actors often attempted to meddle in their operation.188
AMENDMENT 13-51 (1987); see also KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 166, at 22.
183. See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum,
33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 151, 166-71 (1990).
184. See BENJAMIN, supra note 107, at 111-22; POWE, supra note 182, at 50-51.
185. See Thomas L. Schuessler, Structural Barriers to the Entry of Additional Television
Networks: The Federal Communications Commission’s Spectrum Management Policies, 54 S.
CAL. L. REV. 875, 921-26, 929 tbl. 10, 938-39, 939 tbl. 16 (1981).
186. This flows from the danger of interference. If channel three (a specific portion of the
radio spectrum) is allocated to a station in Philadelphia, it cannot also be allocated to a
station in New York. The technology existet—then and now—to allow stations to cover much
more territory. If the allocation scheme had allocated stations so that they simply covered the
country, there would have been enough room on the spectrum for thirteen networks. See
Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First
Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 275-79, 279 n.175 (2003).
187. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L. A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment
Principles for Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719, 1736 (1995) (noting
that the FCC’s allocation plan “gave great weight to factors such as placing at least one
transmitter in as many communities (and, therefore, congressional districts) as possible....
The allocation plan sacrificed viewer interests in access and diversity to narrow political
concerns and entrenched industry goals.”).
188. The examples are legion. Among the more prominent: Nixon’s White House talk about
threatening not to renew the license of the Washington Post’s television station as a way of
punishing the newspaper for breaking the Watergate story; the Nixon White House setting
up meetings with the heads of the broadcast networks to complain about their allegedly antiNixon coverage and to threaten them with denial of licenses if this continued; and Congress
including in a massive continuing resolution a rider forbidding the FCC from extending any
current grants of temporary waivers from its multiple ownership rules, which affected only
an affiliate of Rupert Murdoch’s News America Publishing, Inc. See News Am. Publ’g, Inc. v.
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In a world with many voices, the gain from influencing any given
broadcaster is diminished, and thus the incentive to meddle is
reduced.
Few networks also led to insipid programming that sought to
appeal to everyone and avoid catering to any particular interests.189
With only three national networks, this was the rational programming strategy. Just to be safe, the FCC required that programs be
aimed at a broad audience. Among the FCC’s important early
decisions were its denial of licenses to several broadcasters (including Eugene V. Debs and the Chicago Federation of Labor) on the
grounds that “there is no place for a station catering to any group.
All stations should cater to the general public and serve public
interest against group or class interest.”190 Again, if there had been
many networks, we would have expected greater segmentation
among networks, catering more to particular interests.
This highlights an important point regarding the response to the
FCC’s ownership rule changes: many of the opponents of the
changes emphasized that they were worried about powerful voices
drowning out smaller ones.191 They expressed a great fear that
homogenization of discourse would result from narrower ownership
groups. Insofar as that was their fear, they should have welcomed
the shrinking of broadcast television’s ratings and importance. It is
hard to see how anything could compare with television broadcasting as a powerful source of homogenization and pablum.192 Indeed,
FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that the rider “strikes at Murdoch with the
precision of a laser beam” and invalidating it on First and Fifth Amendment grounds);
JONATHAN W. EMORD, FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 227 (1991); POWE,
supra note 182, at 130-32.
189. See Newton N. Minow, Address to the National Association of Broadcasters (May 9,
1961), in NEWTON M. MINOW & CRAIG L. LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND: CHILDREN,
TELEVISION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 185 (1995); Ralph Nader & Claire Riley, Oh, Say Can
You See: A Broadcast Network for the Audience, 5 J.L. & POL. 1, 24-46, 55 (1988). Indeed, a
central argument for the creation of PBS was that the three commercial television networks
produced uninspired programming because they “[are] obliged for the most part to search for
the uniformities within the general public, and to apply [their] skills to satisfy the
uniformities [they have] found.” THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CARNEGIE
COMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION: PUBLIC TELEVISION, A PROGRAM FOR ACTION 13-14
(1967).
190. Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. 36 (1929); see BENJAMIN, supra note 107, at
20-23.
191. See supra note 25 and accompanying text; supra note 72 and accompanying text.
192. See C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS 44-70 (1994); CASS R.
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I don’t think that any other form of communication has had
anywhere near the homogenizing effect that broadcast television
has had.
A decrease in the audience share of broadcast television will
likely reduce homogenization—whether the lost viewers move to
cable and satellite networks, the Internet, or nothing at all. It is
possible, of course, that most or all of the viewers who abandon
broadcast networks will go to the same cable network, or the same
website. If so, the move from broadcast television would not result
in people viewing programs from more networks (they would just be
different networks). They would have the choice to access a wide
variety of sources, but would fail to do so. If this occurred, it is not
clear that homogenization would be reduced (depending on whether
we focus on the practical choices available, which would increase, or
the actual choices made). But this scenario is highly unlikely, and
inconsistent with the empirical data. The increase in cable viewing
that has occurred concomitant with the decrease in broadcast
viewing has been spread over a wide range of cable networks.193 The
cable audience is highly fractionated—much more so than is the
audience that relies on broadcast television (i.e., who do not
subscribe to cable or satellite), which overwhelmingly watches one
of the four major broadcast networks.194 There is every reason to
believe that the next set of migrants from broadcasting to cable will
act like all the other sets and divide themselves among a wide
variety of stations, rather than migrating to just one or two cable
networks. People will likely view all sorts of niche networks, thereby
reducing homogenization.195 A similar point applies to the
Internet.196 Studies of Internet traffic show a highly fractionated

SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 59-66 (1993); Ronald K.L. Collins
& David M. Skover, The First Amendment in an Age of Paratroopers, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1087,
1097-1107 (1990); Reed Hundt, The Public’s Airwaves: What Does the Public Interest Require
of Television Broadcasters?, 45 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1096-99 (1996).
193. See supra notes 154-57.
194. See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for Delivery of
Video Programming, 19 F.C.C.R. 1606, ¶ 26 n.69 (2004) (noting the large number of cable
channels and their relatively low viewership as compared to the big network broadcasters).
195. See id. at app. C, tbl. C-1 & C-2 (listing myriad niche cable channels).
196. See Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1833
(1995).
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universe. Homogenization on the Internet pales in comparison to
that on broadcast television.197
It bears emphasizing that this point about homogenization also
relates to fears about the influence of powerful interests. If no
broadcast (or other) outlet garners more than, say, 5% of the
audience, there is no single lever that a powerful interest—whether
private or government—can pull. Controlling the top three broadcast networks means one thing when their combined audience share
is 90%, and something else entirely when their combined share is
30%. It is harder for anyone to monopolize the attention of masses
of people when those masses are getting their information from so
many different sources.
One other problematic aspect of broadcasting bears mention: its
reliance on advertising.198 This creates a kink in the feedback loop
between viewers and programmers. Broadcasters air what we are
willing to watch, not what we actually want to pay for out of our
own pockets.199 Put differently, viewers’ intensity of preference does
not register. This increases the likelihood of least-common-denominator programming. If people could register their strength of
preferences (e.g., via willingness to pay), then the strong preferences
of relatively small groups would likely result in programming that
responded to those preferences. Reliance on the advertising model,
however, reduces the chances of such niche programming being
197. See BENJAMIN M. COMPAINE & DOUGLAS GOMERY, WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?:
COMPETITON AND CONCENTRATION IN THE MASS MEDIA INDUSTRY 575-79 (3d ed. 2000).
198. Transmission of television signals did not have to develop this way. On a number of
occasions television and radio companies have sought to engage in subscription
television—signals that only subscribers could decode, like modern cable and satellite
television. From the earliest days of spectrum regulation until relatively recently, however,
the FCC has opposed subscription services, pushing instead for broadcasting that would be
freely available to all. See KMLA Broad. Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette Vendors Corp.,
264 F. Supp. 35, 41 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Howard A. Shelanski, The Bending Line Between
Conventional “Broadcast” and Wireless “Carriage,” 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1055, 1055-57 (1997);
Yoo, supra note 153, at 1669-71. Even when allowed, the few subscription services have been
heavily restricted. See Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC 6 nn.22, 24
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so/3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=555821. Transmitters, acting as broadcasters because they could not offer subscription
services, had to get revenue from somewhere and that produced reliance on the advertising
model.
199. Indeed, advertisers focus not on a generalized “we,” but on viewers whom they deem
to have the biggest payoff for advertising—those demographic groups that are likely to be
persuadable and to have the income to spend.
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aired. Moreover (and relatedly), the advertising model appears to do
a worse job of capturing, and therefore reflecting, the value of
programming to viewers.200 This is not surprising: there is no reason
to expect that the revenue generated by advertising would equal the
revenue generated by viewer payments.201 As it turns out, people’s
willingness to buy products advertised on a program does not
approximate the value they place on that program.202 Studies
suggest that, relative to pay-per-view, the advertising model results
in less informational programming as well as lower revenue and
lower output.203
Most of the arguments against the role of television programming
in a democratic society are really based on (justified) concerns about
the primacy of advertising in the broadcast model. The argument is
that there is a market failure because programmers respond not to
the market signal that we want to send (our strength of preference
for a particular program), but rather to the signal sent by us to
advertisers (our willingness to watch their program, and its
advertisements, instead of cutting the grass).204 The fear is that we
get programming that we tolerate, rather than programming we
affirmatively want.205 Broadcasters care that viewers watch a given
program and see the commercials, but so long as a viewer is willing
to watch, broadcasters do not care how much the viewer enjoys the
program. Intensity of viewer preference, in other words, is neither

200. See ROGER G. NOLL ET AL., ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION 23 (1973)
(estimating that the advertising model understates viewers’ willingness to pay by a factor of
about seven).
201. See Jona R. Minasian, Television Pricing and the Theory of Public Goods 7 J.L. &
ECON. 71, 74-75 (1964).
202. See id.
203. See Claus Thustrup Hansen & Soren Kyhl, Pay-Per-View Broadcasting of Outstanding
Events: Consequences of a Ban, 19 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 589, 590, 601-04 (2001) (finding lower
revenue for advertising-supported television); Steinar Holden, Network or Pay-Per-View?: A
Welfare Analysis, 43 ECON. LETTERS 59, 62-64 (1993); Harvey J. Levin, Program Duplication,
Diversity, and Effective Viewer Choices: Some Empirical Findings, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 81, 82
(1971) (finding that pay television produces more informational programming than does
advertising-supported television); Yoo, supra note 153, at 1680-81.
204. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 192, at 62-63 (describing the failure of the advertising
driven model of broadcasting to reflect consumer preferences); C. Edwin Baker, Giving the
Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 319-21 (1997) (describing the conflict between
viewers’ and advertisers’ interests).
205. See Benkler, supra note 177, at 98, 101.
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very relevant to, nor very apparent in, the advertiser-supported
system.206
The main argument in favor of the advertising-based model is
that it gives access to those unable to afford subscription fees. But
assuming that access to programming is a net good, the obvious
solution is to subsidize the provision of programming to those who
are too poor to afford cable or satellite.
Some will be persuaded by the arguments laid out above in this
Part of the Article and others may not. Even if you ignore the points
I have made so far in this Part, however, there is a powerful
argument that does not depend on them in any way: There is little
justification for the massive allocation of a tremendously valuable
resource—radio spectrum—to broadcasting (and only broadcasting).
The government auctions virtually all spectrum, and the proceeds
fund government operations. The main exception is spectrum
allocated for broadcasting, which the government licenses free of
charge.207 This distorts the competitive playing field: all forms of
communication would welcome having their means of transmission,
or any other key input (e.g., wire for cable operators, spectrum for
satellite companies, or delivery trucks for newspapers and magazines) provided by the government gratis, but only broadcast
spectrum has been consistently so provided.208 People rely on
broadcasting, but people also rely on cable, satellite, newspapers,
shelter, and clothing, yet none of those is subject to this sort of

206. It is no coincidence that cable programming, particularly on HBO, has gained a loyal
following and numerous awards for programming that is bolder than the offerings on
broadcast television. HBO does not depend on advertisers, but instead can appeal more
directly to viewers. As an HBO executive explained, “[w]e’re not any braver than the
networks. It’s just that our economic basis is different.” Jan Hoffman, TV Shouts ‘Baby’ (and
Barely Whispers ‘Abortion’), N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1992, at H1, H27.
207. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (2000) (requiring the use of auctions for nearly all initial
spectrum licenses and construction permits, but making exceptions for licenses and
construction permits for digital television service, public safety radio services, and
noncommercial educational or public broadcast stations).
208. Some satellite (and other) services received some spectrum licenses before auctions
were authorized (and subsequently mandated), and thus did not pay the FCC for them. See
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-66 (HR 2264) (1993) (authorizing
auctions for common carrier and private radio licenses); 47 U.S.C. §309(j) (statute passed in
1997 mandating auctions for almost all spectrum licenses). Post-1997 applicants for those
services have paid for their spectrum licenses, however, whereas broadcasters have never paid
for their licenses.
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subsidy.209 And note that the degree of reliance may be a function of
this market distortion: reducing the costs of broadcasting (via free
spectrum) increases demand.210
In addition, devoting spectrum to broadcasting constricts the
amount of spectrum available for other services, raising their costs.
Every bit of spectrum can be used by more than one service, and
many services can operate via wire instead of wirelessly. The main
advantage of spectrum over wire is mobility. Commentators have
long noted that the best nominee for wire is broadcast television:
fewer people move their televisions while using them than is true of
other telecommunications devices. Indeed, few people move their
televisions while watching them, period. This fact led Nicholas
Negroponte to posit that all television should be delivered via wire
(and all telephony should be delivered wirelessly).211
This argument is particularly strong in light of the fact that the
television band is underutilized in two ways. First, much of the
megahertz devoted to broadcasting is not used. One aspect of such
underutilization is that in many areas spectrum dedicated to
television broadcasting is unused because broadcasting on those
frequencies is not sufficiently valuable to entice any broadcasters.212
209. See Yoo, supra note 186, at 354 (discussing problems with giving away the broadcast
spectrum).
210. See id. (“[A]ltering the relative prices of the various spectrum-based services makes
broadcasting artificially appealing from an economic standpoint.”).
211. See NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 24 (1995) (identifying the “Negroponte
Switch” as the idea that “the information currently coming through the ground (read, wires)
will come in the future through the ether, and the reverse. Namely, what is in the air will go
into the ground and what is in the ground will go into the air.”).
212. See Benjamin, supra note 160, at 16-17 (discussing this underutilization); Fred H.
Cate, The First Amendment and the National Information Infrastructure, 30 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1, 37-38 (1995) (citing UHF frequencies as an example of a market where scarcity does
not exist because broadcasters prefer VHF frequencies); Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner,
A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 224-25 (1982)
(discussing low market demand for spectrum outside large cities, especially “in the UHF band,
where some channels have remained unclaimed for decades”); see generally Public Notice,
FCC, Television Channel Utilization (Sept. 9, 1997), 1997 WL 557928 (listing commercial
channel utilization around the country); Faulhaber & Farber, supra note 160, at 4 (noting that
the UHF band “is extremely underutilized”). The FCC is in the process of diminishing this
underutilization by reallocating some of the existing channels for other purposes and using
some existing allotments for digital television purposes, but thus far the process is far from
complete and has been beset by delays. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the
Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald
Coase’s “Big Joke”: An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335, 542
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Another form of underutilization arises from governmentmandated spectrum buffers between television broadcasters (i.e.,
unused frequencies between the frequencies used by two different
broadcasters). It appears that low-power services could operate in
these buffers while causing little or no interference with existing
uses, but the government has permitted very little use of these
buffers.213 This spectrum would be of great value to other users
(such as cellular telephony providers), but other services have not
been permitted on the spectrum.
A different form of underutilization arises from the fact that the
vast majority of television households receive their local broadcast
stations via cable or satellite. Specifically, over 88% of households
get their television via cable or satellite.214 For those viewers,
broadcasters are just one more cable channel. If the broadcasters
ceased to broadcast and simply sent their signals to cable and

(2001) (noting that “[d]espite the existence of abundant unoccupied bandwidth after the
digital TV license awards, transitional concerns (moving UHF-TV stations) continue to delay
the implementation of new services”).
213. See An Inquiry into the Future Role of Low Power Television Broadcasting and
Television Translators in the National Telecommunications System, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,468, ¶¶
3, 29 (May 18, 1982) (stating that “interference to communications services” was one of six
“decision criteria,” and permitting low power television between channels two and sixty-nine);
IRA BRODSKY, WIRELESS: THE REVOLUTION IN PERSONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 17 (1995)
(“[T]he spectrum shortage is a manufactured problem. For example, the UHF-TV band
comprises 336 MHz of bandwidth. Few cities have more than a half dozen active UHF-TV
stations (each occupying just 6 MHz). The rest of the UHF-TV band has been sitting around
for years collecting electromagnetic dust.”); Benjamin, supra note 160, at 12-16 (noting that
low-power uses have put forward strong arguments that they could operate in buffers and
cause de minimis interference, but that the FCC has allowed very little utilization of these
buffers); Thomas W. Hazlett & Matthew L. Spitzer, Digital Television and the Quid Pro Quo,
2 BUS. & POL. 115, 124 (2000) (stating that it is “unnecessary to use vacant slots [buffers] for
interference control because of the possibility of using newer technologies ... or of allowing
non-interfering wireless services other than TV to utilize unoccupied frequencies”); Paul
Baran, Is the UHF Frequency Shortage a Self Made Problem?, Speech at the Marconi
Centennial Symposium (June 23, 1995), available at http://www.interesting-people.org/
archives/interesting-people/199507/msg00023.html.
Tune a spectrum analyzer across a band of UHF frequencies and you encounter
a few strong signals. Most of the band at any instant is primarily silence, or a
background of weaker signals. The spectrum analyzer connected to an antenna
reveals that much of the radio band is empty much of the time!
Id.
214. See FCC, Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for Delivery
of Video Programming, 19 F.C.C.R. 1606, app. B, tbl. B-3 (Jan. 28, 2004).
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satellite companies (as cable channels do), the vast majority of users
would find no change in their service.215
The cost of opening all spectrum currently devoted to broadcast
to other uses would be fairly small, and the benefits very great.216
The main benefit would be the value of the spectrum that would be
opened to other uses.217 Television broadcasting occupies hundreds
of megahertz of “prime beachfront” spectrum. This spectrum would
be quite valuable for a wide variety of uses, including many forms
of point-to-point communication (e.g., wireless telephony). Indeed,
in 1992 two FCC economists calculated that allowing cellular
services on a single UHF television channel in Los Angeles would
increase social welfare from 1992-2000 by over $1 billion.218 The
215. Furthermore, the 12% who do not subscribe to cable or satellite are by no means
confined to those who cannot afford it. This number includes many people who could afford
cable or satellite but choose not to subscribe. See Robert Kieschnick & B.D. McCullough, Why
Do People not Subscribe to Cable Television?, A Review of the Evidence 3-4
(Telecommunications Policy Research Conference 1998) (finding that “even for households in
the lowest income bracket, the decision not to subscribe to cable television is more often the
result of a preference than an inability to afford services”), available at http://www.tprc.
org/abstracts98/kieschnick.pdf .
216. See THOMAS W. HAZLETT, THE U.S. DIGITAL TV TRANSITION: TIME TO TOSS THE
NEGROPONTE SWITCH 21 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No.
01-15, 2001).
217. Note that the government would not have to prohibit broadcasting in order for this
migration to occur. If the government allowed licensees to sell their spectrum and allowed the
owner to use its spectrum for any service that it desired, we would have every reason to expect
that most broadcasters would migrate to cable and satellite and then use their spectrum for
other purposes (e.g., wireless telephony). See infra Part IV.B. If the government did not
condition the must-carry regime on local stations actually broadcasting or rescinded mustcarry for stations that continued to broadcast, then the broadcast model would be even more
unattractive. Of course, broadcasters’ happiness with the migration—and perhaps its political
viability—would depend in significant part on the degree to which they received the proceeds
from the sale of the spectrum for these higher-valued uses. See infra Part IV.B.
It bears noting, though, that in a world of total spectrum flexibility, some broadcasters
might be the highest bidders for some spectrum. As Hazlett has stated,
[w]hile unlikely, it is not impossible that television broadcasting would emerge
a net demander in an auction of TV Band spectrums. If channels were packed
efficiently by the full complement of digital transmission and receiving
techniques now available, additional bandwidth to create large packages of
[over-the-air] programming could promote rivalry with subscription video
systems. Allowing liberal use of TV Band radio spectrum would test such
opportunities in a competitive marketplace.
HAZLETT, supra note 216, at 20.
218. See EVAN R. KWEREL & JOHN R. WILLIAMS, CHANGING CHANNELS: VOLUNTARY
REALLOCATION OF UHF TELEVISION SPECTRUM vii (OPP Working Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 27, 1992), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp27. pdf.
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revenue generated by selling the spectrum would depend on auction
prices, of course, but the estimated range is $52 billion to $470
billion.219 Another benefit to this transition would be avoiding the
costly mandated transition to televisions that can receive digital
broadcasting signals. Thomas Hazlett estimates the cost of that
transition, and thus the savings from avoiding that transition, as
another $49 to $147 billion.220
The main cost of moving broadcasters to cable or satellite would
be the dislocation of those who rely on broadcast television and
cannot afford the alternatives. There is, however, a fairly easy way
to shift this cost to the government for those people who are too poor
to afford cable or satellite: Hazlett estimates that the government
could pay for satellite dishes or cable hook-ups and a basic set of
channels (slightly better than they were getting via broadcast) for
about $300 per household.221 This would produce a total cost of $3
billion, and everyone who could not afford cable or satellite would
be able to move to satellite.222 Even if Hazlett is wrong and the cost
is $1000 per household, this would still yield a total cost of $10
billion, far less than the spectrum would bring at auction.223
Without the high levels of cable and satellite subscribership, and
the relatively low cost of subsidizing those without cable or satellite
to get it, ending broadcasting would be a much less attractive
219. Id. Another estimate of the auction value of the broadcast spectrum, based on the
auctions for spectrum for third generation wireless services, is $367 billion. See MICHAEL
CALABRESE, BATTLE OVER THE AIRWAVES: PRINCIPLES FOR SPECTRUM POLICY REFORM 4 (New
Am. Found., Working Paper, 2001); Thomas Lenard, No More Delays on Digital TV (May 4,
2004), available at http://news.com.com/2010-1040-5203382.html.
Hazlett has further noted that the auction value would not capture all the value, as there
would be considerable consumer surplus—indeed he suggests that the annual consumer
surplus could be as high as the total auction bids (i.e., $52 billion to $470 billion). See
HAZLETT, supra note 216, at 21.
220. See HAZLETT, supra note 216, at 14.
221. See id. at 16.
222. J.H. Snider and Michael Calabrese note that we could complete the conversion to
digital television, and thus reclaim half the spectrum devoted to broadcast (because right now,
broadcasters have two six-megahertz allotments) even more cheaply. If the United States
followed the Berlin model and provided (via tax credits) digital-to-analog converter boxes for
those low-income people who currently rely on analog over-the-air receivers, the projected cost
would be $578 million. Even if all over-the-air households were subsidized (and the lowincome households still received their boxes gratis), the cost would be only $942 million. See
Snider & Calabrese, supra note 176, at 6 tbl. 3.
223. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
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proposition. The obvious comparison is radio broadcasting. Satellite
radio is widely available and has had a fairly successful introduction, but the vast majority of radio listeners still rely on broadcast:
More than 95% of radio listeners tune in to broadcasters via
antennas. If all the radio stations stopped broadcasting, there would
be massive dislocation. This is quite different from television
broadcast networks, as they could cease broadcasting tomorrow and
88% of viewers would see no alteration in their service.224
Note that the decrease in viewing of broadcasting channels does
not directly increase the 88% figure, and it is an increase in the
percentage of households subscribing to cable or satellite that
makes the argument for a switch to cable or satellite all the more
compelling.225 But reducing the viewership of broadcasters will
make the migration to cable and satellite more likely and more
palatable, for three reasons. First, there will be fewer people who
care very much what happens to broadcasters (because, by hypothesis, they are not watching the broadcast stations). Second, lower
broadcast viewing means fewer homes to migrate to cable or
satellite. As fewer people watch broadcast television, we can expect
that more who want to watch television will sign up for cable or
satellite service.226 These viewers will have signed up for cable or
satellite on their own. Third, it will be harder for Congress or
anyone else to justify occupying broadcasting’s valuable spectrum
to benefit a smaller and smaller number of people who rely on that
spectrum.
Although a decline in broadcasting viewership makes it easier to
move broadcast channels to cable and satellite, this does not mean
that moving the channels to cable or satellite will bring about the
demise of the stations that currently broadcast. On the contrary,
there is good reason to expect that the stations that currently
broadcast will continue operating as they have been—the only
224. Also, radio has more diversity in its programming, because there have always been
lots of radio stations in each market. See Karl A. Groshaufmanis, Comment, What Films May
We Watch: Videotape Distribution and the First Amendment, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1277
n.107 (1988).
225. As the percentage of television households who subscribe to cable or satellite increases
and the percentage of households who rely on broadcasting concomitantly decreases, the
opportunity cost of devoting valuable spectrum to reach people rises.
226. It bears noting that the rate of cable and satellite subscribership has been inversely
related to broadcasters’ market share. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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difference will be that all viewers, instead of most, will see them via
cable or satellite rather than via an antenna. For the vast majority
of households, the broadcast component of their local station is
irrelevant. The local broadcast stations are carried over the cable
wire or via satellite. So if everyone receives television via cable or
satellite, instead of almost everyone, the local stations should be
able to operate as before.
But won’t cable and satellite networks exclude these local
stations, thereby depriving viewers of a station that they would
want to see? In fact, the history of cable and satellite networks
indicates otherwise. Both have sought to carry popular local
stations, and satellite in particular has been hurt by its failure to
carry them.227 The larger answer, though, is that insofar as we have
any fear that cable or satellite providers will want to exclude major
local stations, or insofar as we want to ensure that even marginal
227. There are two empirical bases for believing that cable and satellite networks would
want to carry such local channels. The first is the experience of local network stations in their
relations with cable networks. The must-carry statute gives local broadcasters two options:
they can opt for must-carry (in which case they must be carried but they receive no
compensation), or they can opt instead for retransmission consent. If they choose the latter,
they can negotiate for compensation from the cable network, but if the negotiations fail they
have no right to be carried. Importantly, they make this decision at the outset. Thus, stations
that choose to negotiate for retransmission consent do not rely in any way on must-carry; it
has no impact on them. As it turns out, in almost every instance an affiliate for ABC, CBS,
Fox, or NBC has opted for retransmission consent. The local stations believe that they add
so much value to the cable operators that they can demand compensation from those
operators; and the operators provide that compensation—demonstrating that the local
stations’ calculation is correct. Must-carry, as it turns out, is utilized only by marginal
stations with low viewerships.
The second empirical basis arises from satellite television. Until recently, satellite
providers did not have sufficient satellite capacity to allow them to provide local channels to
their subscribers, who had to rely on their antennas for local stations. This proved to be a
significant problem for satellite providers. Cable networks made much of this difference,
emphasizing in their advertising that only cable would provide premium channels as well as
all the local ones. It turned out that this really did matter to many customers: the most
common reason given for customers rejecting satellite was that they could not receive their
local channels through the same satellite receiver. People wanted to see local broadcast
channels even when they used cable or satellite.
Admittedly, this experience applies only to local broadcast stations that are at least as
popular as the less popular cable stations. Cable and satellite companies like to carry such
stations (e.g., the network stations), because it makes their service more attractive. Note that
this is a fairly low threshold, as the less popular cable stations have low ratings. Some local
broadcasters, however, have very few viewers. If some local broadcasters have so few viewers,
however, it is not clear why we would care about their demise. If we do care about their well
being, however, that would be an argument for continuing the must-carry regime.
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local broadcasters are carried, there is an obvious solution: the
statutory regime already in place that mandates carriage of local
broadcast stations.228 All that would be required is for Congress to
eliminate the reference to broadcasting (as the stations would not
broadcast anymore) and replace it with whatever criteria Congress
deemed suitable.229
Maybe the fear is that the shift to cable and satellite transmission
will make the local stations’ programming and/or the networks’
228. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
229. Note that this need not produce any difference in the number or identity of the
stations carried. The statute could, for instance, simply require carriage of all broadcast
stations operating as of the date of passage of the revised legislation. This would grandfather
those stations indefinitely, which in practice is no different from the situation that currently
applies to broadcast stations. Although the FCC retains the authority to deny renewal to a
station and thus force it off the airwaves, Congress narrowed the bases for non-renewal in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, and the FCC has not denied renewal to a single television
license since then (and the one radio license it attempted to revoke—because the station
claimed to be minority controlled when it was not—was reinstated on appeal. Trinity Broad.
of Fla., Inc. v. FCC, 211 F.3d 618 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). Formats are freely changeable and licenses
freely transferable (and the transferee gets the same renewal expectation as the original
incumbent had), so the ability of a station to change its format or ownership could remain as
is.
It bears noting, however, that this would give Congress an opportunity to choose other
options that might serve different—and perhaps better—goals. Cable operators’ major
complaint about must-carry is that it requires them to carry stations that have very low
market shares, and that can operate successfully only because they are guaranteed carriage
on the cable network. Congress could mitigate this phenomenon by requiring, for example,
carriage of only stations that exceeded a certain level of viewer support.
This might be appropriate given the attempts by unpopular stations to utilize the DTV
transition to force cable companies to carry them. Most notably, KVMD television in
Twentynine Palms, California decided to cease analog broadcasting and switch to digital-only,
apparently because the reach of its digital signal was greater and thus it could demand that
cable companies that had not carried its analog signal be forced (under the must-carry regime)
to carry its digital signal. See, e.g., Mediacom California LLC, 2003 WL 22682107 (FCC Nov.
14, 2003) (discussing KVMD’s demand that a cable operator, which had not carried its analog
signal, carry its digital signal in light of the broader reach of that signal); KVMD Licensee Co.
v. Comcast Cable Communications, Inc., 19 F.C.C.R. 5245 (2004) (discussing same). In this
endeavor, it has met some success: the FCC has required that some companies carry its
digital signal in light of its greater reach. See, e.g., id. ¶ 17. The irony is that KVMD is not
only unpopular, but also is a creature of must-carry. In fact, KVMD averred in its petition to
stop broadcasting its analog signal that “there is no over-the-air viewing of KVMD(TV).”
KVMD(TV), Twentynine Palms, CA Second Request to Discontinue Analog Operations, 18
F.C.C.R. 9131, 9131 (2003). KVMD explained that “nearly all of those who view the station
receive KVMD(TV) through cable and direct broadcast satellite, not through over-the-air
transmission.” Id. KVMD did not need to worry about losing over-the-air viewers when it
ceased analog broadcasting, because it had none. In other words, KVMD is just another cable
station—one that would not exist but for the must-carry regime.
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programming less popular, resulting in local stations and/or the
networks losing viewers even though they will still be available to
every television household. But why would that be? Local stations,
and the network programming they carry, are already just another
cable channel for the vast majority of viewers, and yet local cable
and satellite subscribers view their local stations in disproportionate numbers.230 Why would that change once the relatively few
remaining broadcast viewers transition to cable or satellite
viewing?231
More fundamentally, why should we expect the evaporation of
local or network viewership with cable/satellite going into 100% of
television households when it has not happened at 88%? For if the
feared change did not occur in the earlier transition from 30% to
40%, or 50% to 60%, why would it happen in the transition from
88% to 100%?
In any event, the bottom line is that increasingly few people
watch broadcast television (whether via cable or via old-fashioned
antennas), and even fewer people rely on old-fashioned antennas for
their television service. The massive allocation of societal re230. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (noting that the average local network
station carried on cable has higher viewership than does any cable or satellite channel).
231. We can imagine situations in which the television stations that currently serve as
local broadcasters do not fulfill that function when they no longer utilize the spectrum.
Perhaps the local broadcasters’ spectrum is put to a higher-valued use and the local
broadcasters decide not to operate as local channels on cable and satellite because they can
make more money operating as, for example, home shopping channels. Or maybe they do want
to operate as cable and satellite channels but there is no must-carry legislation, and I am
wrong that the cable and satellite companies will want to carry these local stations. Or,
finally, maybe the local broadcasters decide to abandon television altogether, and provide, for
instance, wireless telephone service. What would happen in one of those situations?
The answer is that if there is a desire among viewers for such stations, we should expect
that cable and satellite companies will provide them. This is what economic theory would
predict. See BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 86-87 (1992) (stating
that a provider will always carry a particular station as long as it is economically viable). It
is already happening, in that many cable operators carry local stations, with programs
focusing on local issues, that do not broadcast. Cable operators carry such stations without
any obligation to do so, for the same reason they carry any station: because it enhances the
cable company’s profits. Indeed, if anything cable and satellite providers might carry more
locally oriented programming once the migration to cable and satellite is complete, as the
increase in channel capacity leads to more niche programming—including, of course,
programs aimed at the local market. See Yoo, supra note 153, at 1661-62. Simply stated, we
are likely to get local stations one way or the other—as long as there is a demand for them.
So even if we lose particular stations, we have every reason to expect that others will rise in
their places.
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sources—principally in the form of spectrum—for broadcast is
getting harder to defend. Accordingly, I suggest that America would
be best served by policies that hasten the demise of broadcasting—or, more precisely, by the opening of the spectrum currently
devoted to broadcasting to other uses.
IV. RAMIFICATIONS
A. Will the Migration of Broadcast Channels to Cable and Satellite Produce a Convergence of Broadcast and Cable/Satellite
Regulation?
The transition from local stations’ distribution to 12% of the
viewers via broadcasting to their distribution exclusively via cable
or satellite may spur a change in what stations are required, or
forbidden, to air: once local stations are no longer broadcasting,
policy makers may find it difficult to support the existence of
different regulatory regimes for broadcast and cable/satellite. There
are fewer divergences between the regulatory schemes for cable and
broadcast television than once existed. For instance, the FCC
repealed the Fairness Doctrine in 1987,232 and the D.C. Circuit
mandated the repeal of the personal attack and political editorial
rules in 2000.233 But a number of regulations remain that apply to
broadcasting and not to cable or satellite—notably, limitations on
the airing of indecency, guidance on children’s television, and equal
access and equal time requirements for elections.234
The full migration of local broadcasters to cable might speed up
a convergence of broadcast and cable/satellite regulations, but it
need not, of its own force, change the regulatory terrain. The fact of
the move from 88% to 100% alters little that courts have found to be
232. Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council Against Television WTVH Syracuse, New York,
2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987). See generally BENJAMIN, supra note 107, at 168-84.
233. Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The court
did not reach the question of whether the rules were consistent with the First Amendment,
and it stated that the FCC could still institute a new rulemaking proceeding “to determine
whether, consistent with constitutional constraints, the public interest requires the personal
attack and political editorial rules.” Id. at 272. Instead the Court based its decision on the
FCC’s response (or lack thereof) to the court’s orders. Id. The FCC has declined, however, to
reinstate the rules.
234. See BENJAMIN, supra note 107, at 189-278.
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relevant in justifying the distinction between broadcast and
cable/satellite regulation. It may, though, have the salutary effect
of encouraging courts and policy makers to recognize the reality that
already exists at 88%—namely that most of the bases on which they
rely in distinguishing broadcast from cable and satellite are not
tenable.
Let’s begin with what might seem like the most obvious
change—the imperiling of regulations that rely on the fact that
broadcasters use the spectrum. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC,235 the Supreme Court upheld the personal attack and political
editorial rules against a First Amendment challenge based on the
rationale that the spectrum was scarce and subject to interference.236 As a result of Red Lion, regulations designed to ensure that
certain content appears on the airwaves—currently, this comprises
regulations on children’s television and on candidates’ access to
television time—might be construed as relying on the fact that
spectrum is scarce and that broadcasters utilize spectrum in their
transmissions.237 If so, the migration advocated in this Article would
seem to undercut those regulations.
One problem with this reasoning is that these days very few
people take spectrum scarcity seriously as a rationale for broadcast
regulation. As numerous commentators (beginning with Ronald
Coase in 1959 and continuing to the present day) have pointed out,
there is nothing special about spectrum in terms of scarcity or
interference.238 All rivalrous goods are subject to interference and
the various ways in which spectrum is scarce are shared by most
other goods.239 Lower courts, scholars, and even the FCC at one
235. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
236. Id. I discuss the rationale of Red Lion in greater depth in Benjamin, supra note 160,
at 39-41.
237. See BENJAMIN, supra note 107, at 204-39, 263-78; Stuart Minor Benjamin, Spectrum
Abundance and the Choice Between Private and Public Control, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2007, 2010
n.6 (2003) (noting cases and FCC materials relying on the scarcity rationale as justifying
broadcast regulation).
238. See, e.g., MATTHEW L. SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND SIX OTHER STORIES 7-18
(1986); Benjamin, supra note 160, at 41-43; R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications
Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 14 (1959); Hazlett, supra note 183, at 138 n.15; Laurence H.
Winer, The Signal Cable Sends—Part I: Why Can’t Cable Be More Like Broadcasting?, 46 MD.
L. REV. 212, 213 (1987).
239. See KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 166, at 53-54 (comparing the spectrum to
labor, steel, and land); Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters,
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point,240 have persuasively contended that the scarcity affecting
spectrum is no different from the scarcity affecting newsprint or
printing presses.241 Indeed, these arguments are so widely accepted
today that the commentators who defend special treatment of
broadcasters do so on other grounds.242 Scarcity has been so
thoroughly discredited as a rationale that its demise seems
inevitable.
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 990, 991 (1989) (asserting that neither the scarcity argument nor the
government property rationale justifies government ownership of the broadcast spectrum).
240. See Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council Against Television Station WTVH Syracuse,
New York, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, ¶ 65 (1987):
We ... believe that the scarcity rationale developed in the Red Lion decision and
successive cases no longer justifies a different standard of First Amendment
review for the electronic press. Therefore ... we believe that the standard applied
in Red Lion should be reconsidered and that the constitutional principles
applicable to the printed press should be equally applicable to the electronic
press.
But see Repeal or Modification of the Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rules, 15
F.C.C.R. 19,973, ¶ 17 (2000) (repudiating “the dicta in Syracuse Peace Council regarding the
appropriate level of First Amendment scrutiny” for broadcast), vacated by Radio-Television
News Dirs. Ass’n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269 (D.C. Cir. 2000). See also Separate Statement of
Harold W. Furchgott-Roth, Guidance on the Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C.
Section 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 F.C.C.R. 8020,
8020-21 (2001) (noting that the “continuing validity” of Red Lion and Pacifica “is highly
doubtful from both an empirical and jurisprudential point of view” and arguing that “as
alternative sources of programming and distribution increase, broadcast content restrictions
must be eliminated”).
241. See Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(“Broadcast frequencies are much less scarce now than when the scarcity rationale first
arose ... and it appears that currently ‘the number of broadcast stations ... rivals and perhaps
surpasses the number of newspapers and magazines in which political messages may
effectively be carried.’”) (quoting Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1983))
(second alteration in original); Coase, supra note 238, at 14 (“[I]t is a commonplace of
economics that almost all resources used in the economic system (and not simply radio and
television frequencies) are limited in amount and scarce....”); Glen O. Robinson, The Electronic
First Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L.J. 899, 903-04 (1998) (stating that
it no longer makes sense to base regulation of the radio spectrum on scarcity); Spitzer, supra
note 239, at 1012-20 (identifying different versions of the scarcity rationale and arguing that
“none of these basic scarcity arguments provides a relevant difference between print and
broadcast that justifies treating the two differently”).
242. See Benjamin, supra note 160, at 5 (“The few commentators who defend the markedly
weaker judicial scrutiny of broadcasters’ regulation than of newspapers’ regulation have
justified that distinction on grounds other than scarcity.” (footnote omitted)); Charles W.
Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing the Constitutionality of
Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 1688-92 (1997) (arguing that the scarcity
rationale does not justify government regulation of the spectrum, but that such regulation can
be justified as a quid pro quo for the government’s granting of spectrum licenses).
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The main holdout thus far has been the Supreme Court. In Red
Lion and in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,243 the Court
invoked scarcity. Although in a later case the Supreme Court
suggested that it would reconsider its scarcity rationale upon a
“signal from Congress or the FCC,”244 and although “[the Court] has
not lately given the distinction [between broadcast and other media]
an enthusiastic endorsement,”245 the Court has not revisited the
scarcity rationale since Red Lion was decided in 1969.246
If the Supreme Court concludes that spectrum scarcity is still
relevant, there is a straightforward answer to the question whether
the migration of the remaining 12% of viewers from broadcasting
would prevent operation of the scarcity rationale and thus imperil
broadcast regulation: no. The projected shift would switch many of
the 12% to satellite—and satellites, of course, use the spectrum. The
percentage of viewers whose service uses the spectrum would thus
decline only modestly. So if we think that spectrum scarcity really
is a valid rationale, then it can still apply, because it would apply to
satellite broadcasting.247 In fact, the D.C. Circuit so ruled in Time
Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC.248
Many will respond to the previous paragraph the way that five
judges of the D.C. Circuit did (in an unsuccessful attempt at
rehearing Time Warner Entertainment): it would be absurd for
spectrum scarcity to apply to satellite broadcasting’s use of the
spectrum.249 This reinforces my larger point about the likely demise
243. 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (upholding the chain broadcasting rules, which restricted the
contractual arrangements that radio networks could have with broadcasters).
244. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377 n.11 (1984) (“We are not prepared,
however, to reconsider our longstanding approach without some signal from Congress or the
FCC that technological developments have advanced so far that some revision of the system
of broadcast regulation may be required.”).
245. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Edwards,
C.J., dissenting).
246. I discuss the implications of the scarcity rationale for government decisions that create
unused or underused spectrum in Benjamin, supra note 160, at 38-45.
247. I am not advocating such a result. Treating cable and satellite differently would create
the same sort of (unfortunate, in my view) regulatory distortions that treating broadcast
different from cable and satellite already creates. I am simply observing that the notion that
spectrum scarcity justifies regulation would seem to apply to all spectrum services.
248. 93 F.3d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
249. See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723, 724 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Williams, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see also Satellite Broad. & Communications
Ass’n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337, 355 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying intermediate scrutiny, rather than
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of the scarcity rationale. Of course spectrum is no longer meaningfully scarce in the way that Red Lion seemed to conceive of it—and
the profusion of broadcast satellite offerings highlights that fact.250
Even if the scarcity rationale was affected by the migration of
local stations from the broadcast spectrum to the satellite spectrum,
this might have limited significance, for two reasons. First, the
regulations that the Supreme Court has justified on scarcity
grounds might be justified on other grounds. Second, many broadcast regulations have not been justified on the scarcity rationale in
the first place.
The first point flows from the fact that some commentators have
sought to justify a wide range of broadcast regulations on grounds
other than those invoked by the Supreme Court. The most widely
suggested alternative to spectrum scarcity is that regulation is a
quid pro quo for the government giving something of value (the
spectrum) to broadcasters free of charge.251 The Supreme Court has
not adopted the quid pro quo rationale, and there are good reasons
not to adopt it.252 But the Supreme Court might well embrace it,
especially as it seems more tenable than scarcity.253 If so, the
movement from spectrum to cable and satellite would not necessarily undermine broadcast regulation. The quid pro quo rationale
could retain its force if the government gave these new channels
special status (e.g., the new form of must-carry), or allowed

lower scrutiny of Red Lion, to a statute obliging satellite operators to carry all local stations
if they choose to carry any local stations).
250. Indeed, the reasoning of Judge Williams’ dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc
in Time Warner Entertainment would imperil the scarcity rationale as applied to any use of
spectrum—a conclusion he elided by suggesting that it was the role of the Supreme Court, not
a court of appeals, to “announce its death.” See 105 F.3d at 724 n.2.
251. See, e.g., Logan, supra note 242, at 1688-92 (arguing that the scarcity rationale does
not justify government regulation of the spectrum, but that such regulation can be justified
as a quid pro quo for the government’s granting of spectrum licenses).
252. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 192, at 108-09 (arguing that “the fact that [the government]
chooses to allocate licenses as it does, rather than through ordinary markets, ought not to give
it power that it would not otherwise have”); Spitzer, supra note 239, at 991-92 (“The
government property rationale also should fail because the government, limited by the First
Amendment and other constitutional provisions, cannot do ‘anything’ it likes with its
resources.”).
253. See Logan, supra note 242, at 1700-05, 1725-46 (arguing that the quid pro quo
rationale is stronger than the widely debunked scarcity rationale).
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broadcasters to receive some of the funds that come from selling the
spectrum that they formerly occupied.254
The second point is that some regulations have not been justified
on scarcity grounds. A major example is the regulatory scheme that
Janet Jackson has made newly hot—indecency. The Supreme Court
upheld the regulation of broadcast indecency in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation,255 but in doing so it eschewed reliance on scarcity and
instead relied on broadcasting’s “uniquely pervasive presence in the
lives of all Americans” and its finding that “broadcasting is uniquely
accessible to children.”256 The Court’s failure to rely on the scarcity
rationale is striking given that the FCC, in its order penalizing
Pacifica and in its brief to the Supreme Court in Pacifica, relied in
part on scarcity.257 The Court invoked other rationales that the FCC
suggested (i.e., pervasiveness and accessibility), but the Court did
not then, or in any later case, suggest that scarcity was relevant to
the validity of indecency regulations.258 Significantly, the rationales
on which the Court did rely apply just as well to cable or satellite as
they do to broadcasting. It is hard to distinguish broadcast from
cable and satellite on grounds of pervasiveness and accessibility to
children.259 For the vast majority of children (and adults), cable and
satellite are the means by which television signals come into their
houses and allow them to sample material as they surf channels.
This is exactly the role broadcasting played for the overwhelming
majority of users when Pacifica was decided in 1978, and for a
relatively small minority today. Once one chooses to bring a
television into the home and subscribe to cable or satellite, those
services are just as pervasive and accessible as broadcast. Accord254. I am not in favor of the government granting licensees anything of value for purposes
of retaining its regulatory authority, but I do note that it could occur.
255. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
256. Id. at 748-49.
257. Citizen’s Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM), New York, N.Y., 56
F.C.C.2d 94, ¶ 9 (1975); Brief for the Federal Communications Commission at 39-40, FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (No. 77-528).
258. See, e.g., Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 770 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The opinions
of my brothers POWELL and STEVENS rightly refrain from relying on the notion of ‘spectrum
scarcity’ to support their result. As Chief Judge Bazelon noted below, ‘although scarcity has
justified increasing the diversity of speakers and speech, it has never been held to justify
censorship.’” (quoting Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
259. See Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 676-77 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(Edwards, C.J., dissenting).
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ingly, the migration of the remaining 12% of viewers should not
change the constitutional status of indecency regulation for
broadcast.
Other regulations are justified on competition grounds based on
the still significant market share of the major broadcasters. Indeed,
that is how the ownership rules issued on June 2, 2003 are
justified.260 As I have noted, there is every reason to expect that the
audience shares of local stations will be just as high after the
migration as before.261 So, insofar as that market position opens the
door to some forms of regulation, the migration to satellite and cable
would not change anything.
This is not to suggest that either policymakers or judges should
conclude that broadcast should continue to be regulated differently
from cable and satellite even after the migration to cable and
satellite is complete. On the contrary (and as the discussion above
indicates), I believe that, both as a matter of policy and constitutional law, there is little basis for distinguishing broadcast from
cable and satellite; and I would hope that policymakers and judges
would agree. But the mere existence of a move from 88% of households relying on cable or satellite to 100% so relying has relatively
little legal significance in terms of the regulations currently
applicable to broadcasting. The legal differences between a world of
88% cable or satellite subscribership and a world of 100% are fairly
modest.262
That said, one advantage of 100% migration is that it would make
it more difficult for policymakers or judges to ignore the great deal
of convergence that has already occurred. As I noted above, cable
260. See 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 1, ¶ 58.
261. See supra notes 227-31 and accompanying text.
262. The move from 88% to 100% for cable and satellite increases the importance, and
perhaps the desirability, of competition rules applicable to cable and satellite operators. The
move from 88% to 100% may be no more important than the move from 76% to 88%, but the
ever-increasing role of two pathways—cable and satellite—tends to strengthen regulations
designed to ensure competition.
Note, though, that the trend is not quite so simple. The increasing substitution of the
Internet for television programming weakens the argument for regulating cable and satellite.
Insofar as there is a single market for news and entertainment that includes both cable and
the Internet, control over cable seems less scary.
In any event, insofar as my proposals would, in fact, lead to greater market power for cable
and/or satellite, that would tend to support regulations designed to prevent harms to
competition.
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and satellite have long shared with broadcast many of the characteristics that were thought to be unique to broadcast. The similarities that would be painfully obvious at 100% migration already exist
at 88%. The main effect of 100% migration, then, would likely be to
spur a long overdue reassessment of the differences in regulatory
regimes.
B. Will the Practical Demise of Broadcasting Lead to Spectrum
Flexibility?
Part II.C suggested that networks have persuasively argued that
raising the national television station ownership limit will enhance
their profitability, and Part III argued that the demise of broadcasting would be good for the country. This does not necessarily mean,
however, that the best choice is to keep the ownership caps low. It
might be that, even if the networks continue to lose audience
share—and maybe even go out of business entirely (or become cable
networks and abandon their local broadcast stations263)—members
of Congress still would refuse to put that spectrum to other, more
valuable uses. That is the risk of the position that this Article
advocates. The practical demise of broadcasting would occur, but the
government still would be dedicating enormously valuable spectrum
to it. This would be the worst possible outcome: network television
would be moribund, and the policymakers would still be unwilling
to allow society’s resources to shift to a better use.
My view is that this risk is fairly small. If few people watch local
television, the pressure on Congress to put that spectrum to better
uses will be intense. There would be significant interests supporting
a change in spectrum usage. Two bear mention. The first is new and
expanding wireless communications companies—who would relish
the opportunity for spectrum with great propagation characteristics
that would probably be cheaper to buy than spectrum has been in
the recent past, precisely because so much new spectrum would
become available. The second is whomever would get the revenue
263. Michael Eisner of Disney threatened to do exactly that with ABC when the ABC
affiliates balked at contributing money for Monday Night Football. That is, he proposed the
“nuclear” option to the affiliates—if they didn’t agree, he would turn ABC into a cable
channel. Steve McClellan, ABC Affils Bristle at Brush-off, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 5,
1998, at 10.
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from spectrum auctions. The obvious possible recipients of this
revenue are the broadcasters themselves (if they were allowed to
keep their licenses and resell them) or the government (if it chose
either not to renew the licenses or to seize them in eminent domain
and pay their fairly small value as broadcast licenses—remember
that the licenses can be used only for broadcasting, and that we are
positing that broadcasting is attracting few viewers). The value
created by allowing the licenses to be used for any purpose is very
great, and with any luck the license holders and government
officials would be able to divide this value in a way that would give
a sufficient incentive to both groups to support opening up the
spectrum to other services. As the ratings for broadcasters decline,
and as more and more users receive the broadcasters’ signal via
cable or wire, the divergence between the value of the licenses for
broadcasting only and the value of the licenses for a wide range of
services will increase. In light of this widening divergence of
broadcasting-only versus flexible licenses, the political viability of
a change in the license restrictions should increase. With any luck
the desire (and lobbying power) of the license holders to receive
greater value and the desire of members of Congress for new sources
of revenue would overwhelm whatever remaining sentiment existed
in favor of keeping spectrum devoted to broadcasting. My hope, and
belief, is that with plummeting ratings for broadcast, the pressure
on the government to reallocate that spectrum would become
overwhelming. If I am right in so asserting, then the demise of
broadcasting would, indeed, lead to a better allocation of society’s
resources, and we could root wholeheartedly for that demise.
CONCLUSION
From the affiliates’ perspective, the main effect of an increase in
the national television station ownership limit will be to reduce the
likelihood and importance of their preemptions of network programming. From the networks’ perspective, the main effect of an increase
in the ownership cap will be to enhance their profitability. My
suspicion is that most readers of this Article are not sympathetic to
the decisions of local stations to preempt network programming that
the local station deems likely to offend the sensibilities of its
audience. Indeed, I suspect that many would affirmatively prefer
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that cultural conservatives lack that power. For such people (some
of whom spoke out in opposition to the increase in the national
ownership limit264), the case for raising the ownership cap might
seem strong: Who could oppose a measure that would strengthen
broadcasting?
In this Article, I take up that cudgel, arguing that the country
would be better off reallocating the valuable resources currently
devoted to broadcasting to other purposes. In my view, the best
policy option is one that allows the spectrum to be used for other
services and avoids an expensive mandate for digital broadcasting.
And the best way to achieve that goal is to hasten the demise of
broadcasting. It is, I acknowledge, in some ways a cynical proposal.
But it is no more cynical than the hardball political economy of the
broadcasters (and government actors) that has gotten us into this
position in the first place.

264. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.

